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Sommario
Con il rapido sviluppo e la crescente complessita` delle reti di com-
puter, i meccanismi tradizionali di network security non riescono a
fornire soluzioni dinamiche e integrate adatte a garantire la completa
sicurezza di un sistema. In questo contesto, l’uso di sistemi per la rile-
vazione delle intrusioni (Intrusion Detection System - IDS) e` diventato
un elemento chiave nell’ambito della sicurezza delle reti.
In questo lavoro di tesi affrontiamo tale problematica, proponendo
soluzioni innovative per l’intrusion detection, basate sull’uso di tec-
niche statistiche (Wavelet Aanalysis, Principal Component Analysis,
etc.) la cui applicazione per la rilevazione delle anomalie nel traffico
di rete, risulta del tutto originale.
L’analisi dei risultati presentata, in questo lavoro di tesi, evidenzia
l’efficacia dei metodi proposti.
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Abstract
With the rapid development and the increasing complexity of com-
puter and communication systems and networks, traditional security
technologies and measures can not meet the demand for integrated
and dynamic security solutions. In this scenario, the use of Intrusion
Detection Systems has emerged as a key element in network security.
In this thesis we address the problem considering some novel statisti-
cal techniques (e.g., Wavelet Analysis, Principal Component Analysis,
etc.) for detecting anomalies in network traffic.
The performance analysis, presented in this work, shows the effec-
tiveness of the proposed methods.
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Introduction
With the rapid development and the increasing complexity of com-
puter and communication systems and networks, traditional security
technologies and measures can not meet the demand for integrated
and dynamic security solutions. Moreover, along with the prolifera-
tion of new services, the threats from spammers, attackers and crim-
inal enterprises also grow.
Recent advances in encryption, public key exchange, digital signa-
ture, and the development of related standards have set a foundation
for network security. However, security on a network goes beyond
these issues. Indeed it must include security of computer systems and
networks, at all levels, top to bottom.
Since it seems impossible to guarantee complete protection to a sys-
tem by means of prevention mechanisms (e.g., authentication tech-
niques and data encryption), the use of an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) is of primary importance to reveal intrusions in a network or in
a system.
State of the art in the field of intrusion detection is mostly rep-
resented by misuse based IDSs that are designed to detect known
attacks by utilizing the signatures of those attacks. Considering that
most attacks are realized with known tools, available on the Internet,
a signature based IDS could seem a good solution. Nevertheless such
!!
“main” — 2012/4/20 — 12:48 — page 2 — #16
!
!
!
!
!
!
2 Introduction
systems require frequent rule-base updates and signature updates, and
are not capable of detecting unknown attacks.
In contrast, anomaly detection systems, a subset of IDSs, model the
normal system/network behavior, which enables them to be extremely
effective in finding and foiling both known as well as unknown or zero
day attacks. This is the main reason why our work focuses on the
development of an anomaly based IDS.
In particular we propose several novel statistical methods to be used
for the description of the “normal” behavior of the network traffic. In
more detail we explore the use of Wavelet Analysis, Principal Compo-
nent Analysis, as well as techniques for Change-Point Detection and
Heavy Hitter Detection.
All the proposed Anomaly based IDSs work on the top of a proba-
bilistic structure, namely the sketch, that allows a random aggregation
of the data, so as to obtain a more scalable system.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Chapter 1 is
devoted to the description of the fundamentals of network security,
mainly focusing on the description of the statistical Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems.
Chapter 2 presents some theoretical background on the sketch data
model, used in this work as a common substrate for all the proposed
systems.
The subsequent four chapters, namely Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6, are
dedicated to the detailed discussion of the implemented methods. In
more detail Chapter 3, at first provides a quick overview of the the-
oretical background about Principal Component Analysis and then
discusses the system architecture and the experimental results. Anal-
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Introduction 3
ogously Chapter 4 is devoted to the presentation of the architecture of
the system based on the Wavelet Analysis, as well as of the achieved
performance. Chapter 5 provides an overview of the Change Detec-
tion algorithms used by the implemented system (CUSUM, Heavy
Hitter and Heavy Change detection algorithms) and then details the
architecture and the performance of the system. Then Chapter 6 dis-
cusses both the architecture and the performance of a system based
on a combined use of Wavelet Analysis and CUSUM.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the work with some final remarks.
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Chapter 1
Intrusion Detection
System
1.1 Network security
In the field of networking the area of network security [1] [2] usually
refers to a complex process, which involves mechanisms and services
necessary to guarantee the security of the information in a distributed
context (e.g., the Internet).
The main objective of this process is to define a security policy that
the network administrator can adopt to prevent and monitor unautho-
rized access, misuse, modification, or denial of the computer network
and network-accessible resources.
To perform such operations it is necessary to keep in mind three
important concepts:
• Absolute security can not be guaranteed : any system can be
compromised, at least, by means of a brute-force attack 1
1A brute force attack is a method of defeating a security scheme by trying a
large number of possibilities; for example, exhaustively working through all possible
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6 Intrusion Detection System
• Security asymptotically improves: securing a system is not a
cost-less operation. Thus, it is necessary to attentively perform
a risk evaluation phase
• Security and easiness are opposite concepts: adding security
mechanisms to a system implies adding complexity
When talking about network security, there mainly exist two stan-
dard documents: RFC 2828 titled “Internet Security Glossary” [3]
and the recommendation X.800 by ITU-T [4]. In the following sec-
tions we describe the architecture presented in X.800, only referring
to [3] in some special cases.
1.1.1 The OSI security architecture
ITU-T recommendation X.800 defines a systematic approach to the
security problems. For our purposes, the OSI security architecture
provides a useful, if abstract, overview of many of the security con-
cepts. The OSI security architecture focuses on security attacks,
mechanisms, and services. These can be defined briefly as follows:
• Security attack: any action that compromises the security of
information owned by an organization
• Security mechanism: a process (or a device incorporating
such a process) that is designed to detect, prevent, or recover
from a security attack
• Security service: a processing or communication service that
enhances the security of the data processing systems and the
keys in order to decrypt a message
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1.1 Network security 7
information transfers of an organization. The services are in-
tended to counter security attacks, and they make use of one or
more security mechanisms to provide the service
In the following we present, in more detail, each of these concepts.
Security services
X.800 defines a security service as a service provided by a protocol
layer of communicating open systems, which ensures adequate security
of the systems or of data transfers. Perhaps a clearer definition is
found in [3], which provides the following definition: “a processing or
communication service that is provided by a system to give a specific
kind of protection to system resources; security services implement
security policies and are implemented by security mechanisms”.
X.800 divides these services into five categories and fourteen specific
services:
• Authentication: the authentication service is concerned with
assuring that a communication is authentic. In the case of a
single message, such as a warning or alarm signal, the function
of the authentication service is to assure the recipient that the
message is from the source that it claims to be from. In the case
of an ongoing interaction, such as the connection of a terminal to
a host, two aspects are involved. First, at the time of connection
initiation, the service assures that the two entities are authentic,
that is, that each is the entity that it claims to be. Second, the
service must assure that the connection is not interfered with in
such a way that a third party can masquerade as one of the two
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8 Intrusion Detection System
legitimate parties for the purposes of unauthorized transmission
or reception. Two specific authentication services are defined in
X.800:
– Peer entity authentication: used in association with a log-
ical connection to provide confidence in the identity of the
entities connected
– Data-origin authentication: in a connectionless transfer,
provides assurance that the source of received data is as
claimed
• Access control: in the context of network security, access con-
trol is the ability to limit and control the access to host systems
and applications via communications links. To achieve this, each
entity trying to gain access must first be identified, or authen-
ticated, so that access rights can be tailored to the individual
• Data confidentiality: confidentiality is the protection of trans-
mitted data from passive attacks. With respect to the content
of a data transmission, several levels of protection can be iden-
tified:
– Connection confidentiality: the protection of all user data
on a connection
– Connectionless confidentiality: the protection of all user
data in a single data block
– Selective-field confidentiality: the confidentiality of selected
fields within the user data on a connection or in a single
data block
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1.1 Network security 9
– Traffic-flow confidentiality: the protection of the informa-
tion that might be derived from observation of traffic flows
• Data integrity: as with confidentiality, integrity can apply to
a stream of messages, a single message, or selected fields within
a message. Again, the most useful and straightforward approach
is total stream protection. As in the previous case, several types
of data integrity are defined in X.800:
– Connection integrity with recovery: provides for the in-
tegrity of all user data on a connection and detects any
modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of any data within
an entire data sequence, with recovery attempted
– Connection integrity without recovery: as above, but pro-
vides only detection without recovery
– Selective-field connection integrity: provides for the in-
tegrity of selected fields within the user data of a data
block and takes the form of determination of whether the
selected fields have been modified, inserted, deleted, or re-
played
– Connectionless integrity: provides for the integrity of a sin-
gle connectionless data block and may take the form of de-
tection of data modification. Additionally, a limited form
of replay detection may be provided
– Selective-field connectionless integrity: provides for the in-
tegrity of selected fields within a single connectionless data
block; takes the form of determination of whether the se-
lected fields have been modified
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10 Intrusion Detection System
• Nonrepudiation: nonrepudiation prevents either sender or re-
ceiver from denying a transmitted message
– Nonrepudiation, origin: proves that the message was sent
by the specified party
– Nonrepudiation, destination : proves that the message was
received by the specified party
• Availability: availability is the property of a system or a sys-
tem resource being accessible and usable upon demand by an
authorized system entity, according to performance specifica-
tions for the system.
It is worth noticing that X.800 treats availability as a property to
be associated with various security services. However, it makes
sense to call out specifically an availability service. An availabil-
ity service is one that protects a system to ensure its availability.
This service addresses the security concerns raised by denial-of-
service attacks. It depends on proper management and control
of system resources and thus depends on access control service
and other security services.
Security mechanisms
In the following we describe the security mechanisms defined in X.800.
As can be seen the mechanisms are divided into those that are imple-
mented in a specific protocol layer and those that are not specific to
any particular protocol layer or security service.
• Specific security mechanisms: may be incorporated into the
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1.1 Network security 11
appropriate protocol layer in order to provide some of the OSI
security services
– Encipherment: the use of mathematical algorithms to trans-
form data into a form that is not readily intelligible. The
transformation and subsequent recovery of the data depend
on an algorithm and zero or more encryption keys
– Digital signature: data appended to, or a cryptographic
transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of
the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data
unit and protect against forgery
– Access control: a variety of mechanisms that enforce access
rights to resources
– Data integrity: a variety of mechanisms used to assure the
integrity of a data unit or stream of data units
– Authentication exchange: a mechanism intended to ensure
the identity of an entity by means of information exchange
– Traffic padding: the insertion of bits into gaps in a data
stream to frustrate traffic analysis attempts
– Routing control: enables selection of particular physically
secure routes for certain data and allows routing changes,
especially when a breach of security is suspected
– Notarization: the use of a trusted third party to assure
certain properties of a data exchange
• Pervasive security mechanisms: mechanisms that are not
specific to any particular OSI security service or protocol layer
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12 Intrusion Detection System
– Trusted functionality: that which is perceived to be cor-
rect with respect to some criteria (e.g., as established by a
security policy)
– Security label: the marking bound to a resource (which
may be a data unit) that names or designates the security
attributes of that resource
– Event detection: detection of security-relevant events
– Security audit trail: data collected and potentially used to
facilitate a security audit, which is an independent review
and examination of system records and activities
– Security recovery: deals with requests from mechanisms,
such as event handling and management functions, and
takes recovery actions
Security Attacks
In the literature, the terms threat and attack are commonly used to
mean more or less the same thing. But, RFC 2828, defines this two
concept in a different way:
• Threat: a potential for violation of security, which exists when
there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could
breach security and cause harm. That is, a threat is a possible
danger that might exploit a vulnerability
• Attack: an assault on system security that derives from an
intelligent threat; that is, an intelligent act that is a deliberate
attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to
evade security services and violate the security policy of a system
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1.1 Network security 13
Regarding the attacks, X.800 defines several specific attacks, divided
into passive and active:
• Active attacks: active attacks involve some modification of
the data stream or the creation of a false stream and can be
subdivided into four categories:
– Masquerade: one entity pretends to be a different entity
– Replay: involves the passive capture of a data unit and
its subsequent retransmission to produce an unauthorized
effect
– Modification of messages: simply means that some portion
of a legitimate message is altered, or that messages are
delayed or reordered, to produce an unauthorized effect
– Denial of Service (DoS): prevents or inhibits the normal
use or management of communications facilities
• Passive attacks: passive attacks are in the nature of eaves-
dropping on, or monitoring of, transmissions. The goal of the
opponent is to obtain information that is being transmitted.
Passive attacks are very difficult to detect because they do not
involve any alteration of the data. Typically, the message traffic
is sent and received in an apparently normal fashion and neither
the sender nor receiver is aware that a third party has read the
messages or observed the traffic pattern.Two types of passive
attacks are:
– Release of message content: we would like to prevent an
opponent from learning the contents of a data transmission
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14 Intrusion Detection System
– Traffic Analysis: traffic analysis, is a subtler type of at-
tack. Suppose that we had a way of masking the contents
of messages or other information traffic so that opponents,
even if they captured the message, could not extract the
information from the message. The common technique for
masking contents is encryption. If we had encryption pro-
tection in place, an opponent might still be able to observe
the pattern of these messages. The opponent could deter-
mine the location and identity of communicating hosts and
could observe the frequency and length of messages being
exchanged. This information might be useful in guessing
the nature of the communication that was taking place
1.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Since, inevitably, the best intrusion prevention system will fail, we
need a mechanism which should act when an intrusion occurs. For
this reason the IDS has been the focus of much research in recent
years.
Definition 1 An IDS is a software or hardware tool aimed at detect-
ing unauthorized access to a computer system or a network.
In other word, an intrusion detection is the act of detecting actions
that attempt to compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availabil-
ity of a system/network.
The attention IDSs have had is motivated by several considerations,
including the following:
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1.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 15
• If an intrusion is detected quickly enough, the intruder can be
identified and ejected from the system before any damage is
done or any data are compromised. Even if the detection is
not sufficiently timely to preempt the intruder, the sooner the
intrusion is detected, the less the amount of damage and the
more quickly recovery can be achieved
• An effective IDS can serve as a deterrent, so acting to prevent
intrusions
• Intrusion detection enables the collection of information about
intrusion techniques that can be used to strengthen the intrusion
prevention facility
Intrusion detection is based on the assumption that the behavior of
intruder significantly differs from that of a legitimate user.
The concept of IDS was first introduced by Anderson in the early
80s [5]. The idea was to perform a post-processing of the audit data
produced by a machine, so as to reveal if any intrusion had been
carried out. The main flaw of this kind of system is that the detection
was performed off-line.
For this reason, 1987 is usually considered as birth date of the IDSs,
when Denning in [6] introduced her Intrusion Detection Expert Sys-
tem (IDES).
The main characteristic of IDES is to be independent of any partic-
ular system, application environment, system vulnerability, or type of
intrusion. IDES is, in fact, a framework for a general-purpose IDS.
Moreover, one of the most relevant feature of IDES is that it intro-
duces the idea of performing the detection of intrusions by means of
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16 Intrusion Detection System
a statistical analysis of the system input data. Thus, roughly speak-
ing, the working of the system is based on the characterization of
the behavior of a subject, with respect to a given object, by means of
a statistical profile. An intrusion is revealed if such a profile is not
respected by the input data.
In more detail, the model has six main components:
• Subjects: subjects are the initiators of actions in the target
system. A subject is typically a terminal user, but might also
be a process acting on behalf of users or groups of users, or
might be the system itself. Subjects can be grouped into classes
by type (groups may overlap)
• Objects: objects are the receptors of actions and typically in-
clude such entities as files, programs, messages, records, termi-
nals, printers, and user- or program-created structures. When
subjects can be recipients of actions (e.g., electronic mail), then
those subjects are also considered to be objects in the model.
Objects can be grouped into classes by type
• Audit records: generated by the target system in response
to actions performed or attempted by subjects on objects-user
login, command execution, file access, and so on
• Profiles: structures that characterize the behavior of a given
subject (or set of subjects) with respect to a given object (or
set thereof), thereby serving as a signature or description of
normal activity for its respective subject and object. Observed
behavior is characterized in terms of a statistical metric and
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1.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 17
model. A metric is a random variable x representing a quanti-
tative measure accumulated over a period. The period may be
a fixed interval of time, or the time between two audit-related
events. Observations xi of x obtained from the audit records
are used together with a statistical model to determine whether
a new observation is abnormal. The statistical model makes no
assumptions about the underlying distribution of x; all knowl-
edge about x is obtained from observations. In more detail the
metric can be:
– Event Counter: x is the number of audit records satisfying
some property occurring during a period of time
– Interval Timer: x is the length of time between two related
events
– Resource Measure: x is the quantity of resources consumed
by some action during a period as specified in the Resource-
Usage field of the audit records
Instead, the statistical model can be:
– Operational model: this model is based on the operational
assumption that abnormality can be decided by comparing
a new observation of x against fixed limits. Although the
previous sample points for x are not used, presumably the
limits are determined from prior observations of the same
type of variable
– Mean and standard deviation model: this model is based
on the assumption that all we know about x1, x2, . . . , xn,
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18 Intrusion Detection System
are mean and standard deviation. A new observation xn+1
is defined to be abnormal if it falls outside a confidence
interval
– Multivariate model: this model is similar to the mean and
standard deviation model except that it is based on corre-
lations among two or more metrics
– Markov process model: this model, which applies only to
event counters, regards each distinct type of event as a
state variable, and uses a state transition matrix to char-
acterize the transition frequencies between states. A new
observation is defined to be abnormal if its probability as
determined by the previous state and the transition matrix
is too low
– Time series model: this model, which uses an interval timer
together with an event counter or resource measure, takes
into account the order and interarrival times of the ob-
servations x1, x2, . . . , xn, as well as their values. A new
observation is abnormal if its probability of occurring at
that time is too low
• Anomaly records: generated when abnormal behavior is de-
tected
• Activity rules: actions taken when some condition is satisfied,
which update profiles, detect abnormal behavior, relate anoma-
lies to suspected intrusions, and produce reports
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1.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 19
1.2.1 IDS taxonomy
IDSs are usually classified on the basis of several aspects, in the follow-
ing we describe the most important categories of these systems [7] [8].
Host-based IDS vs. Network-based IDS
A first distinction is usually made between host-based IDS (HIDS)
and network-based IDS (NIDS). The main difference between these
two categories is given by the input data of the system: a HIDS
mainly processes the operating system’s logs, while a NIDS processes
the network traffic.
As a consequence of that, the first class of IDSs reveals those attacks,
towards a single host, that leave some traces in the host’s audit files.
It should be clear that the most relevant limitation of this approach is
given by the fact that these systems strongly depend on the OS. This
fact usually takes to a low level of interoperability among different
systems.
On the contrary, the NIDSs, processing low level data, do not depend
on the hosts architecture. Moreover, these system are able to detect
attacks that do not affect the system log files and can protect an entire
LAN rather than a single host.
Stateless IDS vs. Stateful IDS
The second distinction we present, between stateful and stateless
IDSs, is based on the approach, used to process the input data. A
stateless system processes each event of the input data independently
of the previous and the following events. On the contrary a stateful
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20 Intrusion Detection System
IDS considers each event of the input data, as part of a stream of
events. Thus the IDS decisions do not only depend on the observed
event, but also on the position of the event in the stream.
It is worth noticing that the stateful technique represents a much
more effective approach, since most intrusions are based, not on a
single act, but on a sequence of operations, which has to be considered
in the whole.
Misuse-based IDS vs. Anomaly-based IDS
A last distinction, probably the most important, is done on the basis
of the detection technique. In this case we can distinguish between
misuse-based IDS (also called signature-based IDS) and anomaly based
IDS.
These two categories are based on a completely different approach to
the intrusion detection problem. Indeed a misuse-based IDS reveals
the intrusions, looking for patterns of action that are known to be
related to an intrusion. These systems have a database, where the
signatures of all the know attacks are stored. Thus, for each observed
event, they run a pattern matching algorithm2, to check if any of those
signatures is present in the input data. To be noted that the use of a
pattern matching algorithm usually implies an heavy computational
effort, which often makes these systems too slow for on-line detection.
On the opposite, an anomaly-based IDS is based on the knowledge of
a model, representing the normal behavior of the controlled system,
2A pattern matching algorithm, sometimes called string searching algorithm,
is an algorithm that looks for a place where one or several patterns (also called
strings) are found within a larger string or text
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1.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 21
and an intrusion is considered as a significant deviation from that
model. Such a model is usually learned by the IDS, during a training
phase, performed on attack free input data. It is worth noticing that
this kind of systems can also detect never seen before intrusions, while
a misuse-based IDS, not having the signature in the database, can
not detect any new attack. This ability is countervailed by a greater
number of false alarms, which usually characterizes the anomaly-based
systems.
Figure 1.1: IDS - hybrid architecture
To conclude such an overview of the different categories, we have to
highlight that to completely protect a computer network we have to
simultaneously use a good combination of all the described systems.
As an example, figure 1.1 shows how the anomaly-based approach
and the misuse based approach can be combined to improve the over-
all performance. Indeed, the first check on data is performed by the
anomaly-based IDS, which only forwards the suspicious data to the
misuse-based system; in this way the second block only checks a small
quantity of data, without excessively slowing down the processing. In
the meanwhile, the misuse-based block, re-processing the data con-
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22 Intrusion Detection System
sidered as anomalous by the first block, reduces the number of false
alarms, which would be generated by the anomaly-based system.
1.3 Abilene/Internet2 Network
The proposed systems have been tested using a publicly available
dataset, composed of traffic traces collected in the Abilene/Internet2
Network [9].
The Internet2 Network is a hybrid optical and packet network used
by the U.S. research and education community. The backbone net-
work consists of nine distinct routers distributed in nine different
states in the U.S., as you can see in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Abilene/Internet2 Network
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1.3 Abilene/Internet2 Network 23
The used traces consist of the traffic related to these routers, col-
lected in one week, and organized into 2016 files, each one containing
data about five minutes of traffic (Netflow data). To be noted that the
last 11 bits of the IP addresses are anonymized for privacy reasons;
nevertheless we have more than 220000 distinct IP addresses.
Since the data provided by the Internet2 project do not have a
ground truth file, we are not capable of saying a priori if any anomaly
is present in the data. Because of this reason we have performed a
manual verification of the data (according to the method presented
in [10]), analyzing the traces for which our system reveals the biggest
anomalies. Moreover we have synthetically added some anomalies in
the data, so as to be able to correctly interpret the offered results. In
more detail, we have added anomalies that can be associated to DoS
and DDoS attacks, represented by four or five distinct traffic flows,
each one carrying a traffic of 5 · 108 bytes (154 anomalies in total),
that span over a single or multiple time-bins.
Since the proposed systems work with ASCII data files, in all these
systems, the input data are processed by a module called, Data For-
matting. This module is responsible of reading the Netflow [11] traces
and of transforming them in ASCII data files, by means of the Flow-
Tools [12]. The output of this module is given by text files containing
on each line an IP address and the number of bytes received by that
IP in the last time-bin.
Note that from the Netflow traces we can extract several other traffic
descriptors. Thus, instead of considering the number of bytes received
by a given IP, the system administrator can easily choose of using an-
other feature, if that better allows her to detect the different attacks.
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Chapter 2
Sketch data model
2.1 Sketch
2.1.1 Data streaming model
In the last years, several data models have been proposed in the lit-
erature. In this section, we describe the streaming data, by using the
most general model: the Turnstile Model [13].
According to this model, the input data are viewed as a stream that
arrives sequentially, item by item. Let I = σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn be the input
stream.
Each item σt = (it, ct) consists of a key, it ∈ (1, . . . , N), and a weight,
ct. The arrival of a new data item causes the update of an underlying
function Ui[t] += ct, which represents the sum of the weights of a
given key until time t.
Given the underlying function Ui[t] for all the keys of the stream, we
can define the total sum S(t), at step t, as follows:
S(t) =
∑
i
Ui[t] (2.1)
This model is very general and can be used in quite different scenar-
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26 Sketch data model
ios. As an example, in the context of network anomaly detection, the
key can be defined using one or more fields of the packet header (IP
addresses, L4 ports), or entities (like network prefixes or AS number)
to achieve higher level of aggregation, while the underlying function
can be the total number of bytes or packets in a flow.
2.1.2 Sketch
Sketches are powerful data structures that can be efficiently used for
keeping an accurate estimate of the function U .
In general, sketches are a family of data structures that use the same
underlying hashing scheme for summarizing data. They differ in how
they update hash buckets and use hashed data to derive estimates.
Among the different sketches, the one with the best time and space
bounds is the so called count-min sketch [14].
In more detail, the sketch data structure is a two-dimensional D ×
W array T [l][j], where each row l (l = 1, . . . ,D) is associated to a
given hash function hl. These functions give an output in the interval
(1, . . . ,W ) and these outputs are associated to the columns of the
array. As an example, the element T [l][j] is associated to the output
value j of the hash function l.
Let I = {(it, ct)} be an input stream observed during a given time
interval. When a new item arrives, the sketch is updated as follows:
T [l][hl(it)]← T [l][hl(it)] + ct (2.2)
The update procedure is realized for all the different hash functions
as shown in Figure 2.1. In this way, at a given time-bin t, the bucket
T [l][hl(it)] will contain an estimate of the quantity Ui[t].
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2.1 Sketch 27
Figure 2.1: Sketch - Update Function
In this work, the sketches have been taken into consideration for two
distinct reasons, which will be clearer in the following: on one hand
they allow the storing of big quantities of data (in our case we have
to store the traffic generated by more than 220000 IP addresses) with
big memory savings, on the other hand they permit a random aggre-
gation of the traffic flows. Indeed , given the use of hash functions, it
is possible to have some collisions in the sketch table. In more detail,
this last fact implies that each traffic flow will be part of several ran-
dom aggregates, each of which will be analyzed to check if it presents
any anomaly. This means that, in practice, any flow will be checked
more than once (within different aggregates), thus, it will be easier to
detect an anomaly. Indeed an anomaly could be masked in a given
traffic aggregate, while being detectable in another one.
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28 Sketch data model
2.1.3 Reversible Sketch
Sketch data structures have a major drawback: they are not reversible.
That is, a sketch cannot efficiently report the set of all keys (in our
case, the flows) that correspond to a given bucket.
To overcome such a limitation, [15] proposes a novel algorithm for
efficiently reversing sketches.
The basic idea is to perform an “intelligent” hash by modifying the
input keys and/or the hashing functions so as to make possible to
recover the keys with certain properties like big changes without sac-
rificing the detection accuracy.
In more detail the update procedure for the k-ary sketch is modified
by introducing modular hashing and IP mangling techniques.
The modular hashing works partitioning the n-bit long hash key x
into q words of equal length n/q, that are hashed separately using
a different hash function, hdi (i = (1, . . . , q)) (let us consider that
the output of each function is m-bit long). Finally, these outputs are
concatenated to form the final hash value (as depicted in Figure 2.2).
δd(x) = hd1(x)|hd2(x)| . . . |hdq(x) (2.3)
Since the final hash value consists of q ×m bits, it can assume w =
2q×m different values.
Note that the use of the modular hashing can cause a highly skewed
distribution of the hash outputs. Consider, as an example, our case in
which IP addresses are used as hash keys. In network traffic streams
there are strong spatial localities in the IP addresses since many IP
addresses share the same prefix. This means that the first octets
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2.1 Sketch 29
Figure 2.2: Modular Hashing
(equal in most addresses) will be mapped into the same hash values
increasing the collision probability of such addresses.
To effectively resolve this problem, the IP mangling technique has
to be applied before computing the hash functions. By using such a
technique the system randomizes, in a reversible way, the input data
so as to remove the correlation or spatial locality.
Essentially, this technique transforms the input set to a mangled
set and performs all the operations on this set. The output is then
transformed back to the original input keys. The function used for
such a transformation is a bijective (one-to-one) function from key
space [2n] to [2n].
A typical function used for this purpose is a function of the form
f(x) ≡ a·x mod 2n (2.4)
with a and 2n relatively prime to guarantee the invertibility of the
function.
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30 Sketch data model
The mangled key can easily be reversed by computing a−1 and ap-
plying the same function to the mangled key, using a−1 instead of
a.
This function has the advantage of being extremely fast to compute
but performs well only for non-adversarial key spaces in which no cor-
relation exists among keys that have different (non empty) prefixes.
Indeed, for any two keys that share the last bits, the mangled ver-
sions will also share the same last bits. Thus distinct keys that have
common suffixes will be more likely to collide than keys with distinct
suffixes.
However, in the particular case of IP addresses, this is not a prob-
lem. Due to the hierarchical nature of IP addresses, it is perfectly
reasonable to assume that there is no correlation between the traffic
of two IP addresses if they differ in their most significant bits.
However, this is not a safe assumption in general. For example, in
the case of keys consisting of source and destination IP address pairs,
the hierarchical assumption should not apply, and we expect to see
traffic correlation among keys sharing the same destination IP but
completely different IP source. And even for single IP address keys, it
is plausible that an attacker could antagonistically cause a non-heavy-
change IP address to be reported as a false positive by creating large
traffic changes for an IP address that has a similar suffix to the target
- also known as behavior aliasing.
Thus, to prevent adversarial attacks against the hashing scheme, a
more sophisticated mangling function is needed.
In [15] the authors propose an attack-resilient scheme based on sim-
ple arithmetic operations on a Galois Extension Field GF(2l), where
!!
“main” — 2012/4/20 — 12:48 — page 31 — #45
!
!
!
!
!
!
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l = log2 2
n.
The function is now defined as follows:
f(x) ≡ a⊗ x⊕ b (2.5)
where “ ⊗ ” is the multiplication operation defined on GF(2l) and
“ ⊕ ” is the bit-wise XOR operation. a and b are randomly chosen
from {1, 2, · · · , 2l − 1}.
By precomputing a−1 on GF(2l), we can easily reverse a mangled
key y using
f−1(y) = a−1 ⊗ (x⊕ b). (2.6)
The direct computation of a⊗ x can be very expensive, as it would
require multiplying two polynomials (of degree l− 1) modulo an irre-
ducible polynomial (of degree l) on a Galois Field GF(2).
In practice this mangling scheme effectively resolves the highly skewed
distribution caused by the modular hash functions as shown in Figure
2.3. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of the number of keys (source
IP address of each flow) per bucket for three different hashing scheme:
• modular hashing with no IP mangling
• modular hashing with the GF transformation for IP mangling
• direct hashing (a completely random hash function)
We observe that the key distribution of modular hashing with the
GF transformation is essentially the same as that of direct hashing.
The distribution for modular hashing without IP mangling is highly
skewed.
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Figure 2.3: IP Mangling - Distribution of number of keys for each bucket
Thus IP mangling is very effective in randomizing the input keys
and removing hierarchical correlations among the keys. In addition,
the scheme is resilient to behavior aliasing attacks because attackers
cannot create collisions in the reversible sketch buckets to make up
false positive heavy changes. Any distinct pair of keys will be mapped
completely randomly to two buckets for each hash table.
The other key point introduced in [15] is the algorithm for reversing
the sketch, given the use of modular hashing and IP mangling.
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2.1 Sketch 33
Notation for the general algorithm
Let us introduce some notations useful for understanding the algo-
rithm.
Let the dth row of the sketch table contain td heavy buckets. Let t
be the value of the largest td. For each row of the sketch assign an
arbitrary indexing of the td heavy buckets and let td,j be the index in
the row d of heavy bucket number j. Also define σp(x) to be the pth
word of a q word integer x. For example, if the jth heavy bucket in
the row d is td,j = 5.3.0.2 for q = 4, then σ2(td,j) = 3.
For each d ∈ [D] and word p, denote the reverse mapping set of
each modular hash function hd,p by the 2m×2
n
q
−m table h−1d,w of
n
q bit
words. That is, let h−1d,w[j][k] denote the kth 2
n
q bit key in the reverse
mapping of j for hd,p. Further, let h
−1
d,p[j] = {x ∈ [2
n
q ]|hd,p(x) = j}.
Let Ip = {x|x ∈
⋃td−1
j=0 h
−1
d,w[σp(td,j)] for at least D−r values d ∈ [D]}.
That is, Ip is the set of all x ∈ [2
n
q ] such that x is in the reverse
mapping for hd,p for some heavy bucket in at least D−r of the D hash
tables. We occasionally refer to this set as the intersected modular
potentials for word p. For instance, in Figure 2.4, I1 has three elements
and I2 two.
For each word we also define the mapping Bp which specifies for
any x ∈ Ip exactly which heavy buckets x occurs in for each hash
table. In detail, Bp(x) = 〈Lp[0][x], Lp[1][x], . . . , Lp[D − 1][x]〉 where
Lp[i][x] = {j ∈ [t]|x ∈ h−1d,p[σp(ti,j)]}
⋃ ∗. That is, Lp[i][x] denotes the
collection of indices in [t] such that x is in the modular bucket potential
set for the heavy bucket corresponding to the given index. The special
character ∗ is included so that no intersection of sets Lp yields an
empty set. For example, Bp(129) = 〈{1, 3, 8}, {5}, {2, 4}, {9}, {3, 2}〉
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34 Sketch data model
means that the reverse mapping of the 1st , 3rd , and 8th heavy bucket
under h0,p all contain the modular key 129.
We can think of each vector Bp(x) as a set of all D dimensional
vectors such that the dth entry is an element of Lp[d][x]. For exam-
ple, B3(23) = 〈{1, 3}, {16}, {∗}, {9}, {2}〉 is indeed a set of two vec-
tors: 〈{1}, {16}, {∗}, {9}, {2}〉 and 〈{3}, {16}, {∗}, {9}, {2}. We refer
to Bp(x) as the bucket index matrix for x, and a decomposed vector
in a set Bp(x) as a bucket index vector for x. We note that although
the size of the bucket index vector set is exponential in D, the bucket
index matrix representation is only polynomial in size and permits the
operation of intersection to be performed in polynomial time. Such a
set like B1(a) can be viewed as a node in Figure 2.4.
Define the r intersection of two such sets to be B
⋂r C = {v ∈
B
⋂
C|v has at most r of its D entries equal to ∗}. For example,
Bp(x)
⋂r Bp+1(y) represents all of the different ways to choose a sin-
gle heavy bucket from each of at least D − r of the hash tables such
that each chosen bucket contains x in its reverse mapping for the
pth word and y for the p + 1th word. For instance, in Figure 2.4,
B1(a)
⋂r B2(d) = 〈{2}, {1}, {4}, {∗}, {3}〉, which is denoted as a link
in the figure. Note that there is not such a link between B1(a) and
B2(e). Intuitively, the a.d sequence can be part of a heavy change key
because these keys share common heavy buckets for at least D − r
hash tables. In addition, it is clear that a key x ∈ [2n] is a suspect
key for the sketch if and only if
⋂r
p=1...q Bp(xp) += 0.
Finally, we define the sets Ap which we compute in our algorithm
to find the suspect keys. Let A1 = {(〈x1〉, v)|x1 ∈ I1 and v ∈ B1(x1)}.
Recursively defineAp+1 = {(〈x1, x2, . . . , xp+1〉, v)|(〈x1, x2, . . . , xw〉, v) ∈
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Aw and v ∈ Bw+1(xw+1)}. Take Figure 2.4 for example. Here A4 con-
tains 〈a, d, f, i〉, 〈2, 1, 4, ∗, 3〉 which is the suspect key. Each element
of Ap can be denoted as a path in Figure 2.4. The following lemma
tells us that it is sufficient to compute Aq to solve the reverse sketch
problem.
Lemma 1 A key x = x1 · x2 . . . xq ∈ [2n] is a suspect key if and only
if (〈x1, x2, . . . , xq〉, v) ∈ Aq for some vector v.
General algorithm for Reverse Hashing
To solve the reverse sketch problem we first compute the q sets Ip and
bucket index matrices Bp. From these we iteratively create each Ap
starting from some base Ac for any c where 1 ≤ c ≤ q up until we
have Aq. We then output the set of heavy change keys via Lemma
1. Intuitively, we start with nodes as in Figure 2.4, I1 is essentially
A1. The links between I1 and I2 give A2, then the link pairs between
(I1I2) and (I2I3) give A3, etc.
The choice of the base case Ac affects the performance of the algo-
rithm. The size of the set A1 is likely to be exponentially large in
D. However, with good random hashing, the size of Ap for p ≥ 2
will be only polynomial in D, q, and t with high probability with the
detailed algorithm and analysis below. Note we must choose a fairly
small value c to start with because the complexity of computing the
base case grows exponentially in c.
The pseudocode of the Reverse Hashing algorithm is reported in
Algorithm 1. Instead, the pseudocode for the functions MODULAR
POTENTIALS and EXTEND is reported in Algorithms 2 and 3,
respectively.
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Algorithm 1 REVERSE HASH(r)
1: for p = 1 : l do
2: (IpBp) =MODULAR POTENTIALS(p, r)
3: end for
4: A2 = 0
5: for x ∈ I1, y ∈ I2 and corresponding v ∈ B1(x)
⋂r B2(y) do
6: insert (〈x, y〉, v) into A2
7: end for
8: for any given Ap do
9: Ap+1 = EXTEND(Ap, Ip+1, Bp+1)
10: end for
11: Output all x1.x2. · · · .xq ∈ [n] s.t. (〈x1, . . . , xq〉, v) ∈ Aq for some
v
2.2 Implementation
Reversible Sketches are a common substrate for all the proposed sys-
tems, used to perform a random aggregation of the data.
In the implemented systems, the module responsible for the con-
struction of the reversible sketch tables takes in input the data files
described in Section 1.2.
As said before, each line of these files contains an IP destination
address and the number of the bytes received by that IP in the last
time bin (i.e. five minutes of traffic).
Each file is thus used to build a distinct sketch table. In more detail,
according to the Tunstile model, presented in Section 2.1.1, the IP
address IPt is considered as the hash key it, while the number of
bytes Bt is considered as the weight ct.
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Algorithm 2 MODULAR POTENTIALS(p, r)
1: Create an D × 2nq table of sets L initialized to all contain the
special character ∗
2: Create a size [2
n
q ] array of counters hits initialized to all zeros
3: for i ∈ [D], j ∈ [t], and k ∈ [2nq −m] do
4: insert h−1d,p[σp(td,j)][k] into L[d][x]
5: if L[d][x] == 0 then
6: hits[x] + +
7: end if
8: end for
9: for x ∈ [2nq ] s.t. hits[x] ≥ D − r do
10: insert x into Ip
11: Bp(x) = 〈L[0][x], L[1][x], . . . L[D − 1][x]〉
12: end for
13: Output (Ip, Bp)
Algorithm 3 EXTEND(Ap, Ip+1, Bp+1)
1: Ap+1 = 0
2: for y ∈ Ip+1, (〈x1, . . . , xp〉, v) ∈ Ap do
3: if thenv
⋂r Bp+1(y) += null)
4: insert (〈x1, . . . , xp〉, v
⋂r Bp+1(y)) into Ap+1
5: end if
6: end for
7: Output (Ap+1)
Note that in our implementation we have used d = 32 distinct hash
functions, which give output in the interval [0;w−1], that means that
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the resulting sketches will be ∈ Nd×w, where w can be varied.
As far as the hash functions are concerned, we have used 4-universal
hashes1 [16], obtained as:
h(x) =
3∑
i=0
ai · xi mod p mod w (2.7)
where the coefficients ai are randomly chosen in the set [0, p− 1] and
p is an arbitrary prime number (we have considered the Mersenne
numbers).
At this point, given that we had N distinct time-bins, we have ob-
tained N distinct sketch tables. Starting from these we consider the
temporal evolution of each bucket Tlj of the sketch table, constructing
d · w time series of N samples Tlj [n] each.
The pseudocode about the sketch computation is given in Algorithm
4.
For sake of brevity we do not describe the function IP MANGLING
and MODULAR HASHING already described in Section 2.1.3.
1A class of hash functions H : (1, . . . , N) → (1, . . . , w) is a k-universal hash if
for any distinct x0, . . . xk−1 ∈ (1, . . . , N) and any possible v0, . . . vk−1 ∈ (1, . . . , w):
Prh∈H = {h(xi) = vi;∀i ∈ (1, . . . , k)} = 1wk
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Algorithm 4 Building the sketch
1: Input: IP destination address - ip1.ip2.ip3.ip4
2: for l = 1 : d do
3: for j = 1 : w do
4: Tn[l][j] = 0 ! sketch table initialization
5: end for
6: end for
7: for n = 1 : N do
8: for t = 1 : S do
9: IP MANGLING(ipt)
10: δ = MODULAR HASHING(ipt)
11: Store : ip1t, ip2t, ip3t, ip4t
12: for l = 1 : d do
13: Tn[l][δ]+ = Bt
14: end for
15: end for
16: end for
17: Output: N distinct hash tables Tn.
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Figure 2.4: Reverse hashing procedure (example)
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Chapter 3
Principal Component
Analysis
3.1 Pricipal Component Analysis
The Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is a linear transformation
that maps a coordinate space onto a new coordinate system whose
axes, called Principal Components (PCs), have the property to point
in the direction of maximum variance of the residual data (i.e., the
difference between the original data and the data mapped onto the
previous PCs).
In more detail, the first PC captures the greatest degree of data
variance in a single direction, the second one captures the greatest
degree of variance of data in the remaining orthogonal directions, and
so on.
A simple illustration of the PCA is shown in Figure 3.1 where the
PCs of a two dimensional dataset are plotted. As you can see in the
figure, the number of PCs is equal to the dimensionality of the original
dataset; the first PC is in the direction that maximizes the variance
of the projected data (green line), the second PC, instead, is in the
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orthogonal direction (blue line).
Figure 3.1: PCs of a two-dimentional dataset
In mathematical terms, to calculate the PCs is equivalent to compute
the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix.
In more detail, given the matrix of data B = {Bi,j}, with 1 < i < m
and 1 < j < t (e.g., a dataset of m samples captured in t time-bins),
each PC, vi, is the i − th eigenvector computed from the spectral
decomposition of the covariance matrix C = BBT , that is:
BBTvi = λivi i = 1, . . . ,m (3.1)
where λi is the “ordered” eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenvector
vi.
In practice, the first PC, v1, is computed as follows:
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v1 = arg max
‖v‖=1
‖Bv‖ (3.2)
where ‖Bv‖2 is proportional to the variance of the data measured
along v.
Proceeding recursively, once the first k−1 PCs have been determined,
the k − th PC can be evaluated as follows:
vk = arg max
‖v‖=1
∥∥∥∥∥(B −
k−1∑
i=1
Bviv
T
i )v
∥∥∥∥∥ (3.3)
where || · || denotes the L2 norm.
Once the PCs have been computed, given a set of data and its as-
sociated coordinate space, we can perform a data transformation by
projecting them onto the new axis.
Typically, the first PCs contribute most of the variance in the original
dataset, so that we can describe them with only these PCs, neglecting
the others, with minimal loss of variance.
For this reason, the PCA is also used as a linear dimension reduction
technique. The main idea is to calculate the PCs and establish how
many of them are sufficient to describe the original dataset. To select
the PCs we can perform the scree plot method.
A scree-plot is a plot, like the one represented in Figure 3.2, of the
percentage of variance captured by a given PC. Thus, studying the
scree plot we can determine the optimal number of variables, in order
to lower the dimensionality of a complex dataset, while maintaing the
most of the variance of the original dataset.
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Figure 3.2: Scree Plot
3.2 System architecture
In this Section, we present the architecture of the system we have
implemented to detect anomalies in the network traffic.
In Figure 4.3 is reported a block scheme of the proposed system.
We can distinguish four main block:
• Data Formatting
• Flow Aggregation
• Time-series Construction
• Anomaly Detector
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• Identification
Figure 3.3: PCA - System Architecture
For sake of brevity we skip the detail related to the Data Formatting
module since a detailed analysis of this block has been made in Section
1.2.
3.2.1 Flow Aggregation
To facilitate the detection of correlation and periodic trends in the
data, we have studied different levels of aggregation. In more de-
tail, the block called Flow Aggregation realizes four different levels of
aggregation:
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• Ingress Router (IR)
• Origin Destination (OD) flows
• Input Link (IL)
• Random Aggregation
Using the IR aggregation, data are organized according to which
router they entered the network. The OD flow aggregates traffic based
on the ingress and egress routers used by an IP flow. Instead, the IL
aggregates IP flows with the same ingress router and input interface.
Finally, the random aggregation is performed by means of the sketch
(as described in Chapter 2).
The output of this block is given by 4T distinct files, each one cor-
responding to a specific time-bin and a specific aggregate.
3.2.2 Time-series Construction
After the data have been correctly formatted, they are passed as input
to the third module, responsible for the construction of the time-series.
Typically the distribution of packet features (packet header fields)
observed in flow traces reveals both the presence and the “structure”
of a wide range of anomalies. Indeed, traffic anomalies induce changes
in the normal distribution of the features.
Based on this observation, we have examined the distributions of
traffic features as a means to detect and to classify network anomalies.
More specifically, in this work, we have taken into consideration the
number of bytes sent by each IP source address.
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The feature distribution has been estimated with the empirical his-
togram. Thus, in each time-bin for each aggregate we have evaluated
the histogram as follows:
Xt = {nti, i = 1, . . . , N} (3.4)
where nti is the number of bytes transmitted by the i− th IP address
in the time-bin t.
Unfortunately, the histogram is an high-dimensional object quite
difficult to handle with low computational resources.
For this reason we have tried to concentrate the information taken
by the histogram in a single value, able to hold the most of the useful
information, that, in our case, is the trend of the distribution.
Previous works [17] [18] [10] have emphasized the possibility to ex-
tract very useful information from the entropy of the distribution.
The entropy provides a computationally efficient metric for estimat-
ing the degree of dispersion or concentration of a distribution.
Given the empirical histogram, Xt, we can evaluate the entropy value
as follows:
Ht = −
N∑
i=1
nti
S
log2
nti
S
with S =
N∑
i=1
nti (3.5)
Nevertheless, the entropy is only able to capture the information
related to a single time-bin, while from our point of view it would be
much more important to capture the the difference between packet
feature distributions of two adjacent time-bins.
For this reason, in this work we have also used another metric that
is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. Given two histograms Xt
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(captured in time-bin t) and Xt−1 (captured in time-bin t − 1), the
KL divergence is defined as follows:
DtKL =
N∑
i=1
nt−1i log
nt−1i
nti
(3.6)
Despite of the method used, this module will output a matrix for
each type of aggregation in which, for all the aggregates, the values
of the metric (entropy or KL divergence) evaluated in each time-bin
are reported.
This matrix has the following structure:
Y =


y11 · · · y1N
...
...
yT1 · · · yTN

 (3.7)
where N is the number of aggregates and T the number of time-bins.
3.2.3 Anomaly Detector
This block is the main component of the detection system. It consists
of a Detection phase, during which the system detects anomalies by
means of the PCA technique, and an Identification phase to identify
the IPs responsible of the anomalies.
PCs computation
After the time-series have been constructed, they are passed to the
module that applies the PCA. The computation of the PCs is per-
formed using Equations (3.2) and (3.3). As described before, typically
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there is a set of PCs (called dominant PCs) that contributes most of
the variance in the original dataset.
The idea is to select the dominant PCs and describe the normal
behavior only using these ones.
It is worth highlighting that the number of dominant PCs is a very
important parameter, and needs to be properly tuned when using the
PCA as a traffic anomaly detector.
In our approach the set of dominant PCs is selected by means of the
scree-plot method. As a result, we separate the PCs into two sets,
dominant and negligible PCs, that will be then used to distinguish
between normal and anomalous variations in traffic.
Figure 3.2 reports a scree-plot of a particular dataset used in our
study. Visually, from the graph we can observe that the first r = 5
PCs are able to correctly capture the majority of the variance. These
PCs are the dominant PCs:
P = (v1, . . . , vr) (3.8)
The method is based on the assumption that these PCs are sufficient
to describe the normal behavior of traffic.
Detection Phase
The detection phase is performed by separating the high-dimensional
space of traffic measurements into two subspaces, which capture nor-
mal and anomalous variations, respectively.
In more detail, once the matrix P has been constructed, we can par-
tition the space into a normal subspace (Sˆ), spanned by the dominant
PCs, and an anomalous subspace (S˜), spanned by the remaining PCs
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The normal and anomalous components of data can be obtained by
projecting the aggregate traffic onto these two subspaces.
Thus, the original data, in the time-bin t, Yt are decomposed into
two parts as follows:
Yt = Yˆt + Y˜t (3.9)
where Yˆt and Y˜t are the projection onto Sˆ and S˜, respectively, and
can be evaluate as follows:
Yˆt = PP
TYt (3.10)
Y˜t = (I − PP T )Yt (3.11)
To be noted that, when anomalous traffic crosses the network, a large
change in the anomalous component (Y˜t) occurs. Thus, an efficient
method to detect traffic anomalies is to compare ‖Y˜t‖2 with a given
threshold (ξ).
In more detail, if ‖Y˜t‖2 exceeds the given threshold ξ, the traffic is
considered anomalous, and we mark the time-bin (t) as an anomalous
time-bin (Figure 3.4).
If we use a random aggregation the detection phase can be improved
performing a further step.
Indeed, in this case, since we have used d different hash functions hj
we have d data matrices, Y j (one for each function). So, the previ-
ously described analysis (performed for each Y j) returns d different
responses.
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Figure 3.4: PCA - Data matrix
Thus, a voting analysis is performed. We evaluate the number of
produced alarms and we decide if the time-bin is anomalous or not
according to the following rule:

 anomalous if number of alarms >
d
2
− 1
normal otherwise
More details about the detection phase are given in Algorithm 5.
3.2.4 Identification
If an anomaly has been detected, the system performs a further phase
called anomaly identification.
Note that the PCA works on a single time-series, so in the detec-
tion phase we are able to identify the time-bin during which traffic is
anomalous. But, at this point, we do not know the specific network
event that has caused the detection.
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Algorithm 5 Detection
1: Input: Data matrices - Y j , j = 0, . . . , d
2: alarm = 0
3: for j = 1 : d do
4: Compute the PCs
5: Select the dominant PCs : P = (v1, . . . , vr)
6: Y˜ j = (I − PP T )Y j ! anomalous component of the traffic
7: if ‖Y˜t‖
2 > ξ then
8: alarm++
9: end if
10: end for
11: if alarm > d
2
− 1 then
12: the time-bin is anomalous
13: end if
In fact, it is worth noticing that an anomalous time-bin may contain
multiple anomalous events, and that a single anomalous event can
span over multiple time-bins.
In this phase we want to identify the specific flows responsible for
the revealed anomaly.
Note that if the traffic aggregation is performed by means of IR, OD
flow, and IL we are not able to determine the specific flow responsible
for the revealed anomaly.
On the contrary, when we use random traffic aggregation, since we
use the reversible sketches, we are able to correctly identify the spe-
cific flows involved in the anomalous traffic. In more detail, at first,
we search the specific traffic aggregation in which the anomaly has
occurred. Then reversing the sketch we can identify the specific flows
that have caused the anomaly.
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3.3 Experimental results
The proposed system has been tested using the dataset presented in
Section 1.2.
Before detailing the performance achieved by the system in terms of
number of detected anomalies and detection rate, let us analyze the
sensitivity of our method to two key parameters, i.e., the dimension
of the normal subspace (number of dominant PCs, r) and the sketch
size w.
It is important to say that the presented performance have been
obtained varying the value of the threshold ξ in a range chosen on the
basis of the values of ||Y ||2.
As previously said, for the selection of an appropriate number of PCs
we can use the scree-plot method. The scree-plot reported in Figure
3.2 is related to random aggregation for a sketch size w of 64 and
bin-size of 5 minutes. From the plot we can easily notice that most
of the data energy is captured by the first five PCs and that after
the eighth PC, the contribution of the remaining PCs is less than 4%.
Thus we have decided to perform our analysis with a number of PCs
r ∈ [2, 7].
Figure 3.5 shows the detection rate (computed over the synthetically
added anomalies) when varying the number of PCs (note that, given
the nature of the dataset, we cannot plot a ROC curve).
It is worth noticing that a very low value of r takes to correctly detect
a good number of anomalies, also raising a big number of false alarms,
due to the fact that also the “normal” components are considered in
the anomalous subspace. Vice-versa, considering a high value of r
takes to a bad detection rate, behavior due to the fact that considering
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a high number of PCs implies to insert in the normal subspace some
anomalous components. Given this, it is evident that r is an important
parameter and it has to be chosen so as to obtain a good trade-off
between detection rate and false alarm rate.
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Figure 3.5: PCA - Detection Rate vs. Number of PCs
Concerning the sketch size, it is important to highlight that in our
implementation we have used d = 8 distinct hash functions, which
give output in the interval [0, w − 1]; so the resulting sketch tables
will be ∈ N8×w, where w is a parameter to set.
The choice of w is very important, since this parameter determines
the number and the composition of the aggregates, significantly in-
fluencing the detection rate. For this reason, we have studied the
!!
“main” — 2012/4/20 — 12:48 — page 55 — #69
!
!
!
!
!
!
3.3 Experimental results 55
detection rate achieved by the system when varying the sketch size.
Figure 3.6 shows the results of such an analysis, when r has been fixed
equal to 5. From an analysis of the achieved results we have concluded
that the best performance are achieved when w = 64. Indeed, even
though the graph shows better performance for w = 32, in that case
there are too few traffic aggregates taking to a huge number of false
alarms.
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Figure 3.6: PCA - Detection Rate vs. Sketch Size
In the following subsections we show the performance achieved by
our system, in terms of detection rate (computed over the syntheti-
cally added anomalies) and total number of detected anomalies. It is
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important to highlight that the system stops analyzing a given time-
bin, once an anomaly has been detected, this implies that the number
of detected anomalies is equal to the number of anomalous time-bins.
The presence of multiple anomalies in a time-bin will be eventually
detected during the identification phase.
Such a results discussion is divided into two distinct parts:
• performance achieved with the different types of traffic aggre-
gations
• performance achieved by using KL divergence
3.3.1 Traffic aggregations
The aim of this first performance evaluation is to establish if con-
sidering different traffic aggregation criteria can somehow modify the
detection rate achieved by the system, and in particular to evaluate
the effectiveness of the random aggregation provided by the use of
sketch. The graphs presented in this section have been obtained with
a sketch size w = 64 and the use of entropy.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 respectively show the detection rate and the total
number of detected anomalies when the OD aggregation is used. The
different curves have been obtained varying the number of PCs. As
expected the best detection rate is obtained when considering a very
low number of PCs, but this implies to have a high number of false
positives. By manual inspecting the dataset, it appears that the best
trade-off is achieved when using 5 PCs.
From the graphs we can see that the performance do not strongly
depend on the number of PCs and that the detection rate and the
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Figure 3.7: PCA - Detection Rate for OD traffic aggregation
total number of detected anomalies decrease following the same trend,
when varying the threshold.
Regarding the IR aggregation the achieved performance are shown
in Figures 3.9 and 3.10. Differently from the previous graphs we
can notice that, in this case, the performance strongly depend on the
number of PCs, and that we have a strong worsening when we consider
more than 3 PCs.
It is also important to notice that, when using IR aggregation, the
total number of detected anomalous events is much lower than in
the previous case. This last consideration can take us to conclude
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Figure 3.8: PCA - Detected Anomalies for OD traffic aggregation
that the IR aggregation behaves better than the OD one, but the
strong dependence of this aggregation on the number of PCs makes
the method hard to be tuned.
From Figures 3.11 and 3.12 we can see that the IL aggregation
presents almost the same behavior of the OD aggregation. Indeed
the performance do not strongly depend on the number of PCs and
present the same trend when varying the threshold.
To conclude this analysis, Figures 3.13 and 3.14 present the perfor-
mance achieved when using random aggregation.
As we can see this method allows us to obtain better performance
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Figure 3.9: PCA - Detection Rate for IR traffic aggregation
in terms of detection rate: indeed the detection rate is stable over the
95%, for several values of the threshold, while the total number of
detected anomalies decreases faster.
To better compare the presented results, in Table 3.1 we show the
detection rate achieved by using the different aggregations, once fixed
the total number of detected anomalies. It is easy to conclude that
the best performance are given by the IR and random aggregations.
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Figure 3.10: PCA - Detected Anomalies for IR traffic aggregation
OD IR IL Random
Detection Rate 51% 90% 43% 90%
Anomalous time-bins 910 910 910 910
Table 3.1: PCA - Detection Rate vs. Anomalous Time-Bins
Moreover, if we consider that in a given time-bin there can be more
than an anomaly, it is clear that OD, IR, and IL aggregation do not
allow us to distinguish between them, since they just reveal an anoma-
lous time-bin, while using the sketch we can also distinguish between
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Figure 3.11: PCA - Detection Rate for IL traffic aggregation
contemporary anomalies, since each flow is part of several aggregates.
It is also important to highlight that we can take profit from this fact,
so as to be able to identify the flows that contribute to the anomaly
in a given time-bin, as previously described.
To sum up we can conclude that the best performance are obtained
with the use of the random aggregation, which is also the only one
that allows the identification of the anomalous flows.
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Figure 3.12: PCA - Detected Anomalies for IL traffic aggregation
3.3.2 KL divergence
The last session of experiments has been conducted to evaluate the
effectiveness of using KL divergence instead of the entropy.
Figures 3.15 and 3.16 respectively show the detection rate and the
number of detected anomalies achieved when using KL divergence.
By comparing these graphs with those related to the use of entropy
(Figures 3.13 and 3.14), it is easy to conclude that the performance
are quite different.
Nevertheless, it is not easy to directly compare these results. To
be able to perform a more significant comparison between the results
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Figure 3.13: PCA - Detection Rate for Random Aggregation
obtained with the different approaches and to realize if, in fact, it takes
to some improvements, we have evaluated some more parameters.
For this reason in Table 3.2 we present the increase in the detection
rate offered by the use of KL divergence. We can notice that the com-
bined use of entropy and KL divergence takes to great improvements
in the performance. As an example, if we consider to use 5 PCs with
a detection rate of 70%, we can see that the 55% of the anomalies are
detected by both the systems, while the 15% detected by using the
entropy is different from the 15% detected by using KL divergence,
thus in this case the detection rate improves from 70% to 85%.
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Figure 3.14: PCA - Detected Anomalies for Random Aggregation
PC Number Detection Rate Additive Detections
3 82% 10%
4 81% 9%
5 81% 10%
3 73% 15%
4 72% 16%
5 70% 15%
Table 3.2: PCA - Kl-entropy Additive Detections
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Figure 3.15: PCA - Detected Anomalies - KL divergence
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Figure 3.16: PCA - Detection Rate - KL divergence
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Chapter 4
Wavelet Analysis
4.1 Wavelet Decomposition and Multiresolu-
tion Analysis
The Wavelet Decomposition [19] is based on the representation of any
finite–energy signal x(t) ∈ L2(R) by means of its inner products with
a family of functions
ψa,b(t) = |a|− 12ψ
(
t− b
a
)
where ψ is a fixed function called mother wavelet.
Thus, the analysis equation for a Continuous Wavelet Transform
(CWT) is defined as follows:
Wx(a, b) = 〈x,ψa,b〉 = |a|− 12
∫ ∞
−∞
x(t)ψ∗
(
t− b
a
)
dt
Starting from the CWT we can derive the Discrete Wavelet Trans-
form (DWT) restricting a and b to a finite discrete set of values.
In more detail, for the discretization we can choose a = am0 , where
m ∈ Z and a0 += 1. For convenience, we can assume a0 > 1. For m =
0, it seems natural to discretize b by taking only the integer multiples
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of one fixed b0 (for convenience b0 > 0), where b0 is appropriately
chosen so that the ψ(t − nb0) cover the whole line. Varing m, the
width of a
−m
2
0 ψ(a
−m
0 t) is a
m
0 times the width of ψ(t) so that the choice
b = nb0am0 will ensure that the discretized wavelets at level m cover
the line in the same way that the ψ(t− nb0) do.
This correspond to use a set of functions {ψm,n(t)}m,n∈Z defined as
follows:
ψm,n(t) = a
−m
2
0 ψ
(
t− nb0am0
am0
)
= a
−m
2
0 ψ(a
−mt− nb0)
obtained choosing a = am0 , b = nb0a
m
0 , with n,m ∈ Z. The values
a0 > 1 and b0 > 0 are fixed and depend on the mather wavelet ψ.
Under quite stringent constraints on the choice of the mother wavelet,
the functions {ψm,n(t)}m,n∈Z may define an orthonormal dyadic wavelet
basis (corresponding to a0 = 2 and b0 = 1). In this case, ψ(t) can be
represented in terms of the so–called scaling function φ(t)
ψ(t) =
√
2
∑
n
gnφ(2t− n)
where φ(t) itself is defined by a two–scale difference equation
φ(t) =
√
2
∑
n
hnφ(2t− n)
with the additional constraint that gn = (−1)n−1 h−n−1.
In this work, we will consider the well–known Daubechies bases fam-
ily of compactly–supported mother wavelets, introduced by the Bel-
gian mathematician Ingrid Daubechies in 1988. The number of non
null coefficients hn depends on the regularity of the mother wavelet
and the number of vanishing moments: for the Daubechies basis Nψ
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of order N (with N vanishing moments) only 2N coefficients are non
zero, so that both Nφ and Nψ has compact support of width 2N − 1.
Figure 4.1 shows the Daubechies bases of order N = 2, 5, 9.
(a) ψ2 (b) ψ5
(c) ψ9
Figure 4.1: Daubechies mother wavelet
The multiresolution analysis represents the theoretical framework
for the efficient calculation of the wavelet decomposition [20]. Let
x = (x1, x2, . . .) denote the approximation of a finite–energy signal
x(t) at a given resolution; the wavelet coefficients {xm,n} at lower
resolutions can be obtained considering the filter bank shown in fig-
ure 4.2, where the coefficients hn and gn depend on the chosen mother
wavelet. In particular, the outputs of the high-pass filter hn give the
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detail coefficients (at the given resolution), while the outputs of the
low-pass filter give an approximation at a lower resolution, which is
further decomposed in a similar way.
g
h 2
2g
h 2
2g
h 2
2x
Level 1 Level 3Level 2
Figure 4.2: Wavelet Decomposition
Wavelet analysis is often used in image processing for edge detection,
that is a method, which aims at identifying points at which the image
brightness changes sharply or has discontinuities. Thus the detection
of anomalies (that can be seen as discontinuities in the network traffic)
seems to be a good application field for wavelet analysis.
4.2 System architecture
In this section, we present the architecture of the system we have
implemented to detect anomalies in the network traffic, whose block
scheme is reported in Figure 4.3. Before detailing the system, in Table
4.1 we present the notations used in the rest of the chapter.
The system is composed of four blocks:
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Symbol Meaning
ξ threshold
AX detection matrix at step X
Bt number of bytes received from ipt, used as weight in the sketch
ct weigth corresponding to the key it
d number of hash functions - number of rows of Tn
DXlj Euclidean distance at step X for the time series Tlj
E(Dlj) average value of DXlj over all the D
X
lj for the element of
the sketch table up to the step X − 1
Fx time series (traffic sent) referred to IPx
it hash key
ipt IP address, used as hash key in the sketch
{IPx}x→X set of source IP addresses that contributes to step X
k constant factor
N number of time-bins
pXlj transformed coefficients at step X for the time series Tlj
Plj reference coefficients for the time series Tlj
s sliding window length
S number of samples of a given input file
t input samples to wavelet transform
Tn sketch table for time-bin n
Tlj time series built from the elements (l, j) of the sketch tables
v sliding window overlap factor
w possible distinct outputs of the hash function - number of
columns of Tn
X detection step
Table 4.1: Wavelet - Notations
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Figure 4.3: Wavelet - System architecture
• Data Formatting
• Sketch module
• Anomaly Detector
• Identification
In the following we have reported a detailed description of each block
skipping the details related to the Data Formatting module and the
Sketch module since an exhaustive analysis of these blocks has been
made in Section 1.2 and 2.2 respectively.
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However, it is important to highlight that as output of this two blocks
we have N (number of distinct time bin) distinct hash tables. Starting
from these, we consider the temporal evolution of each element Tlj of
the sketch table, constructing d · w time series of N samples Tlj [n].
4.2.1 Anomaly Detector
Wavelet coefficients computation
In this block the wavelet transform is applied to each time series. To
perform such an operation the system makes use of a sliding window
(see Figure 4.4) of dimension s = 16 samples (with an overlap factor v
equal to 8 samples), and computes the transformed coefficients pXlj of
each block of s samples. The first time we compute such coefficients
(for the first s samples), we just store them as reference coefficients
Plj , while for all the other samples of the time series, we use such
coefficients to compute the Euclidean distance DXlj between them and
the reference coefficients.
If such a distance is lower than a given threshold ξ (see next sub-
section to understand how this threshold is computed) we update
the reference coefficients, setting them to the newly computed trans-
formed coefficients, otherwise, if DXlj > ξ, the system has revealed an
anomaly and the reference coefficients are not updated.
The output of such a phase is a binary table, where the generic
element (l, j) is equal to one if there is an anomaly (i.e., DXlj > ξ), is
equal to zero otherwise.
More details about this and the subsequent phase are given in Algo-
rithm 6.
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Figure 4.4: Wavelet Analysis
Threshold Computation
As described in the previous subsection, to evaluate the temporal evo-
lution of the wavelet coefficients pXlj of the given time series Tlj[n], we
compute the Euclidean distance between the transformed coefficients
of subsequent blocks of samples. Such a distance is then compared to
a threshold ξ.
To avoid the use of a statically designed threshold, we have developed
a method that allows ξ to adapt to the temporal evolution of the values
of the computed distances. In more detail, ξ at a given step is set to
the average value of the distances computed over all the sketch table
up to the previous step plus the standard deviation multiplied by a
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constant value k, that is ξ = E(Dlj) + k · σ.
Note that, since ξ is initialized equal to zero, when the system starts
working, it has a transitory phase during which it will not be able to
detect anomalies.
It is worth noticing that the system, differently from many other
anomaly detection algorithms, does not need a training phase during
which it has to be fed with anomaly-free traffic (see experimental
results section for more details). Indeed it just presents a transitory
phase, necessary to compute the first reference coefficients as well as
the parameters needed to compute the threshold.
4.2.2 Identification
If an anomaly has been detected during the detection phase, the sys-
tem performs a new phase called anomaly identification. Note that
this phase is necessary since we are not able to determine, up to this
point, which flows are responsible for the revealed anomaly; indeed we
can only determine in which traffic aggregation (randomly determined
by the use of the sketch) the anomaly has occurred.
Given the use of the reversible sketch, we can identify the specific
flows that have caused the anomaly, “simply” reversing the sketch.
4.3 Experimental results
Also in this case the proposed system has been tested using the dataset
presented in Section 1.2.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of combining sketch and wavelet
analysis, the results obtained by our system have been compared with
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Algorithm 6 Detection
1: ξ = 0
2: X = 0
3: for l = 1 : d do
4: for j = 1 : w do
5: for a = 1 : (s− v) : (N − s+ 1) do ! sliding window: a from 1 to
(N − s+ 1) with increment (s− v)
6: b = a+ s− 1
7: for r = a : b do
8: t[r] = Tlj [r] ! samples for the wavelet transform
9: end for
10: compute the transformed coefficients pXlj
11: if X == 0 then
12: Plj = p
X
lj
13: else
14: compute the Euclidean distance DXij between Plj and p
X
lj
15: ξ = E(Dlj) + kσ(Dlj)
16: if DXlj ≤ ξ then
17: Plj = p
X
lj
18: else
19: AX [l][j] = 1 ! Matrix containing 1 if there is an anomaly, 0
otherwise
20: end if
21: end if
22: X+ = 1
23: end for
24: end for
25: end for
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those achieved by using a “classical” heavy change method built on
the top of sketches, based on the evaluation of the traffic received by
each aggregate in a given time-bin, with respect to the previous time-
bin [21]. Note that, we have not compared our system to one simply
based on the wavelet analysis of each traffic flow, because this kind of
approach would be computationally unfeasible in a real scenario.
Before detailing the performance achieved by the system in terms
of number of detected anomalies and detection rate, let us analyze
some graphs showing the distances computed in the detection phase,
comparing them with the threshold computed as described in the
previous section.
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Figure 4.5: Wavelet - Distance - Original Traces
The Figures 4.5, 4.6 show the distances computed for the first row
of the sketch table, related to the traffic of a single router (the same
considerations still hold for all the other rows and routers). These
distance were computed over the original traces and over the traces
where we have added the anomalies. The red line in the graphs rep-
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Figure 4.6: Wavelet - Distance - Traces with artificial anomalies
resents the threshold evolution.
In Figure 4.5 where we show the distances computed over the original
traces, the distances present some peaks that, after a manual analysis
of the traces, have resulted to be connected to network attacks.
Figure 4.6 shows the same distances, after that the synthetic anoma-
lies were added. It is easy to notice that the inserted anomalies are
represented by peaks in the graph that can be easily detected by our
system.
The graphs in Figures 4.7-4.9 show the performance of the system,
in terms of number of detected anomalies and detection rate, and
compare them to the performance of a “classical” heavy change-based
method.
In Figure 4.7 we plot the number of detected anomalies, both con-
sidering the original traces and those obtained after having inserted
the synthetic anomalies, as a function of the threshold (i.e., of the
constant factor k).
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Figure 4.7: Wavelet - Number of detected attacks
It is easy to see that the system is able to correctly detect all the in-
serted anomalies (477 distinct flows), as also testified by the detection
rate plotted in Figure 4.9. It is worth noticing that, when detecting all
the synthetic anomalies, our system also detects some more anomalies
(about 70 anomalous flows), which after a manual inspection of the
traces have mainly resulted to be due to network anomalies.
Note that our approach decreases the number of false alarms with
respect to the heavy change detection method, as demonstrated by
Figure 4.8. Indeed, from this figure, where we report the detections
for the heavy change method, we can see that the number of detected
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Figure 4.8: Heavy Change Detection: number of detected attacks
flows, not corresponding to synthetic anomalies, increases to about
120 and, in this case, the inspection of the traces has revealed that
many of these flows correspond, in fact, to “normal” traffic. Moreover,
we can also note that with this “classical” method the number of ar-
tificial anomalies detected by the system suddenly decreases, making
hard to correctly choose the “working point” of the system.
It is also important to notice that the system has resulted to be
robust to the presence of anomalies in the very initial time-bins, cor-
responding to a transitory phase, during which the system is not yet
able to correctly compute the threshold as well as the reference coef-
!!
“main” — 2012/4/20 — 12:48 — page 81 — #95
!
!
!
!
!
!
4.3 Experimental results 81
10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
f(threshold)
de
te
cti
on
 ra
te
Figure 4.9: Wavelet - Detection rate
ficients used to detect anomalies.
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Chapter 5
Change Detection
5.1 Change-Point Detection
Change-point detection is the problem of discovering time points at
which properties of time series change. The main idea is that the
structure of an information system can be described by a stochastic
model, and that a failure leads to an abrupt change of the structure.
This change occurs at an unknown point in time. The change-point
detection allows us to detect such an event.
The problem can be formalized as follows. Let Xn, n ≥ 1, be a
sequence of observations that are being chosen for monitoring. The
observed random variables X1,X2, . . . have a joint probability density
function (pdf) p0(X1, . . . ,Xn) until a change occurs at an unknown
time ta. After the change occurs, the observations have another distri-
bution p1(X1, . . . ,Xn). In other words, it is assumed that X1,X2, . . .
have the conditional pdf p0(Xn|X1, . . . ,Xn−1) for n < ta and the con-
ditional pdf p1(Xn|X1, . . . ,Xn−1) for n ≥ ta, where p0 and p1 are pre-
change and post-change pdfs, respectively. Therefore, if the change
occurs at time ta = k, then the conditional density of the kth obser-
vation changes from p0(Xk|X1, . . . ,Xk−1) to p1(Xk|X1, . . . ,Xk−1). A
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sequential change-point detection procedure is identified with a stop-
ping time τ for an observed sequence Xnn≥1 i.e., the time of alarm
τ , at which it is declared that a change has occurred, is a random
variable depending on the observations.
The problem of discovering time points at which properties of time
series change is attracting a lot of attention in the network anomaly
detection field.
The idea of the approach is based on the observation that an attack
leads to relatively abrupt changes in statistical models of traffic com-
pared to the “normal mode”. This changes occur at unknown points
in time and should be detected “as soon as possible”. Therefore, the
problem of detecting an attack can be formulated and solved as a
change-point detection problem.
5.1.1 Cumulative Sum control chart(CUSUM)
The CUSUM is a sequential analysis technique, typically used for
monitoring change detection.
Let us suppose to have a time series, given by the samples xn from a
process, the goal of the algorithm is to detect with the smallest pos-
sible delay a change in the distribution of the data. The assumption
of the method is that the distribution before and after the change
(fθ1(x) and fθ2(x)) are known. As its name implies, CUSUM involves
the calculation of a cumulative sum, as follows:
S0 = x0
Sn+1 = Sn + log
( fθ2 (x)
fθ1 (x)
) (5.1)
The rationale behind the CUSUM algorithm is that, before the
!!
“main” — 2012/4/20 — 12:48 — page 85 — #99
!
!
!
!
!
!
5.1 Change-Point Detection 85
change the quantity log
( fθ2 (x)
fθ1 (x)
)
is negative, whereas after the change
it is positive: as a consequence, the test statistics Sn decreases be-
fore the change, and it increases linearly with a positive slope after
the change, until it reaches the threshold ξ when the alarm is raised.
Figure 5.1 shows an intuitive derivation of the method.
Figure 5.1: Intuitive derivation of the CUSUM: time series (upper graph)
and CUSUM statistics (lower graph)
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Note that the assumption about the knowledge of the two distribu-
tions fθ1(x) and fθ2(x), implies that CUSUM is only able to decide
between two simple hypotheses. But, in case of network anomalies we
cannot suppose that the distribution after the change is known (usu-
ally neither the distribution before the change is known). This implies
the need of using the non parametric version of the algorithm [22],
which leads to a different definition of the cumulative sum Sn. In
more detail in this work we have used the multi-chart non parametric
CUSUM (MNP-CUSUM), in which the quantity Sn is defined as:
S0 = x0
Sn+1 = (Sn + xn − (µn + c · σn))+
(5.2)
where µn and σn are the mean value and the standard deviation until
step n, while c is a tunable parameter of the algorithm.
5.2 Streaming Change Detection
Using Streaming technique, the anomaly detection problem can be
formulated as a Heavy Hitter (HH) detection problem or a Heavy
Change (HC) detection problem. In the HH detection problem, the
goal is to identify the set of flows that represent a significantly large
portion of the ongoing traffic or the capacity of the link. In the HC
detection problem, the goal is to detect the set of flows that have
drastic change from one time period to another.
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5.2.1 Heavy Hitter Detection
A HH, in a dataset, is an element whose relative frequency exceeds a
specified threshold.
In more detail, given an input stream I = {(it, ct)} with the as-
sociated total sum S, a HH is a key, whose associated underlaying
function U [i] is not smaller than a specified portion of the expected
size of the whole dataset. The problem can be formalized as follows.
Given a threshold ξ (0 < ξ < 1) the set of HHs is defined as:
HH = {i | U [i] > ξ · S} (5.3)
In the context of network anomaly detection, a HH is an entity which
accounts for at least a specified portion of the total activity measured
in terms of number of packets, bytes, connections, etc. A HH could
correspond to an individual flow or connection. It could also be an
aggregation of multiple flows/connections that share some common
property, but which themselves may not be HH.
Given this, we define the HH detection problem as the problem of
finding all the HHs, and their associated values, in a data stream. As
an example, let us consider that the destination IP address is the key,
and the byte count the weight; then in this case the corresponding
HH detection problem is to find all the destination IP addresses that
account for at least a portion ξ of the total traffic.
5.2.2 Heavy Change Detection
In the contest of anomaly detection, the goal of HC detection is to
efficiently identify the set of flows that have drastic changefrom one
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time period to another with small memory requirements and limited
state information.
Modelling the data stream using the Turnstile model the problem
can be formalized as follows:
A HC is a key i, whose associated underlaying function U [i], eval-
uated in a given time-bin, significantly differs in size if compared to
the same function evaluated in the previous time-bins.
For sake of simplicity, let us suppose that we want to detect the HC
related to two adjacent time-bins. In this case, a key is a HC if the
difference between the values evaluated in the two time-bins exceeds
a given threshold (ψ). The problem can be formalized as follows. Let
U1[i] and U2[i] be the values associated to the key i, evaluated in the
time-bin 1 and 2 respectively, and let Di be the relative difference,
defined as Di = |U1[i] − U2[i]|. Then the set of HCs is defined as
follows:
HC = {i | Di > ψ} (5.4)
As an example, in the context of network anomaly detection, the
goal of HC detection can be to identify the flows that have significant
changes in traffic volume from one time period to another.
5.3 System architecture
In this section we detail the architecture of the proposed systems.
We have implemented three different systems based on the three
different Change Detection approaches described in the previous sec-
tions.
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Figure 5.2: Change Detection - System Architecture
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Figure 5.2 shows a block scheme of the systems.
We can distinguish four main blocks:
• Data Formatting
• Sketch module
• Anomaly Detector
• Identification
As you can see in the figure the three systems share the first two
blocks (already described in Section 1.2) and the Identification mod-
ule, while they differ for the Anomaly Detector module.
The HC-based method is called Method 1 in the figure, while Method
2 and Method 3 respectively refers to a HH change detection approach
and a CUSUM based method.
The following subsections describe the Anomaly Detector module of
the proposed systems.
5.3.1 Anomaly Detector
Method 1
Method 1 is a simple HC-based method that works comparing the
data related to two adjiacent time-bins, that is two consecutive sketch
tables.
In practice, the system computes the euclidean distance dij between
each element T [i][j] of the current sketch table and the corresponding
element T ref[i][j], where T ref[i][j] is the element T [i][j] corresponding
to the last non anomalous time-bin.
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In more detail, assuming that the system is processing the time-
bin n, then each element of the sketch table T n is compared with
the corresponding element of the “reference” sketch table T ref, where
T ref is equal to the “last occurred” non anomalous sketch table, i.e.,
T ref = T n−r for some (r = 1, 2, . . . , n). Note that this algorithm has
been introduced to avoid the “masking effect” that can be caused by
anomalies that span over multiple time-bins.
If the computed distances exceed a given threshold (dnij > ξ) in at
least H distinct rows of the sketch table (where H is a tunable pa-
rameter), the system considers the current time-bin as anomalous and
then performs the anomaly identification for revealing the responsible
IP flows.
The pseudo-code related to the detection algorithm, run at each
time-bin, is reported in Algorithm 7.
Method 2
This method, is much more complex than the first one but it still
results to be (as demonstrated in the experimental section) suitable for
on-line detection of anomalous flows. Basically, it tracks the variations
in the HH distribution of the network traffic.
In more detail, as it can be seen from Figure 5.2, the sketch T is
given in input to two distinct modules, namely a forecast module and
a HH matrix construction module.
The forecast module takes in input its own output at the previous
step and the “reference” sketch table T ref, that is -as in the previous
case- the “last occurred” non anomalous sketch table, and uses these
two elements for forecasting the value of the next sketch table. Note
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Algorithm 7 Detection: Method 1
1: for i = 1 : D do
2: ci = 0
3: end for
4: C = 0
5: for i = 1 : D do
6: for j = 1 : W do
7: dni,j = |T
n[i][j] − T ref[i][j]|
8: if dni,j > ξ then
9: ci = 1
10: end if
11: end for
12: C+ = ci
13: end for
14: if C > H then ! H tunable parameter
15: time-bin n is anomalous
16: else
17: T ref = Tn
18: end if
19: Output: anomalous time-bins
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that the use of T ref has been introduced, as in Method 1, to avoid the
“masking effect” due to “long” anomalies.
The prediction phase is performed by using an Exponentially Weighted
Moving Average (EWMA) forecast algorithm, described by the follow-
ing equation:
T̂ n = αT n−1 + (1− α)T̂ n−1
or the Non-Seasonal Holt-Winters (NSHW) algorithm,
T̂ n = T̂ ns + T̂
n
t
with
T̂ ns = αT
ref + (1− α)T̂ n−1
T̂ nt = β(T̂
n
s − T̂ n−1s ) + (1− β)T̂ n−1t
where α and β ∈ [0, 1] are tunable parameters.
Algorithms 8 and 9 report the pseudo code for the forecasting phase
at each time-bin using EWMA and NSHW, respectively.
Algorithm 8 Building the forecasted sketch (EWMA)
1: for i = 1 : D do
2: for j = 1 : w do
3: if n == 2 then
4: bTn[i][j] = T 1[i][j]
5: end if
6: if n > 2 then
7: bTn[i][j] = αT ref[i][j] + (1− α) bTn−1[i][j]
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: Output: forecasted sketch
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Algorithm 9 Building the forecasted sketch (NSHW)
1: for i = 1 : D do
2: for j = 1 : w do
3: if n == 2 then
4: cTs
n
[i][j] = T 1[i][j]
5: bTt
n
[i][j] = T 2[i][j] − T 1[i][j]
6: end if
7: if n > 2 then
8: cTs
n
[i][j] = αT ref[i][j] + (α− 1) bTn−1[i][j]
9: bTt
n
[i][j] = β(Tns [i][j] − T
n−1
s [i][j]) + (1− β) bTt
n−1
[i][j]
10: end if
11: bTn[i][j] = Tns [i][j] + T
n
t [i][j]
12: end for
13: end for
14: Output: forecasted sketch
Given this step, the system has two distinct values for the sketch at
time-bin n, the real value T n and the predicted value T̂ n. Both these
tables are fed to a module, responsible for computing an empirical
distribution of the HHs.
This “distribution” is computed by evaluating the HHs present in the
traffic, that is the traffic aggregates (namely the sketch buckets) that
exceed a given threshold, given by a percentage of the total traffic in
the time-bin, Sn. The related buckets are then updated by inserting
the quantity of traffic for which that aggregate exceed the threshold,
while all the other buckets are set to one byte (this last point is mainly
done for computational reasons). Finally each row of the matrix is
normalized so as that its elements sum to one. Algorithm 10 illustrates
the procedure for computing this matrix in a given time-bin.
This matrix is named MnHH if computed starting from T
n and M̂nHH
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Algorithm 10 Building the HH matrix
1: for i = 1 : D do
2: for j = 1 : w do
3: MnHH [i][j] = 1 ! HH matrix initialization
4: end for
5: end for
6: for i = 1 : D do
7: NF = 0
8: for j = 1 : w do
9: if T [i][j] − ξSn > 0 then
10: MnHH [i][j] = T
n[i][j] − ξSn ! Sn total traffic in the time-bin
11: end if
12: NF+ = MnHH [i][j]
13: end for
14: for j = 1 : w do
15: MnHH [i][j] = M
n
HH [i][j]/NF ! matrix normalization
16: end for
17: end for
18: Output: matrix of the distribution of the HH
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if calculated starting from T̂ n.
Given these two matrices, the system compares the actual HH dis-
tribution in MHH with the forecasted one in M̂HH . To perform such
a task the system computes a distance between each line of the two
matrices. In this case, the system allows us to choose between the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, KL(MnHH [i][·], M̂nHH [i][·]) and the
Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD), JSD(MnHH [i][·], M̂nHH [i][·]). Note
that JSD has been introduced in this system to overcome the poten-
tial limitations given by the asymmetric nature of KL. Indeed, the
JSD between two generic vectors P and Q is defined as:
JSD(P,Q) =
1
2
·KL(P,M) + 1
2
·KL(M,Q) (5.5)
where KL is defined as
KL(P,Q) =
∑
i
pi · log(pi/qi) (5.6)
and M is the “average” of P and Q, that is mi = (pi + qi)/2.
To decide if the considered time-bin is anomalous, we have imple-
mented a voting algorithm, that is if the computed distance exceeds
a given threshold ψ for more than H rows of the matrix, the system
reveals an anomalous time-bin and the anomaly is thus identified.
The whole detection phase, for a given time-bin, is described by the
pseudo code in Algorithm 11.
Method 3
This third method is based on the use of the MNP-CUSUM algorithm,
described in Section 5.1.1.
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Algorithm 11 Detection: Method 2
1: C = 0
2: for i = 1 : D do
3: dni = Dist(M
n
HH [i][·], cM
n
HH [i][·] = 1)
4: ! Dist = JSD or Dist = KL
5: if dni > ψ then
6: C ++
7: end if
8: end for
9: if C > H then ! H tunable parameter
10: time-bin n is anomalous
11: else
12: T ref = Tn
13: end if
14: Output: anomalous time-bins
As it can be seen from Figure 5.2, this module takes in input the
sketch T . It is worth noticing that in this method the single buckets
of the sketch are used independently to construct d ·w time series on
which the CUSUM algorithm is applied. Hence, the value contained
in each bucket of T is used to update the CUSUM statistics, related
to the time series associated to that bucket.
About the algorithm parameters, the quantity µ and σ have been
estimated by using the EWMA algorithm, while the value of the pa-
rameter c has been set equal to 0.5 (note that the algorithm has
experimentally shown to be robust to the choice of this parameter).
An anomaly, in a given time series, is thus detected at a given time-
bin, if the test statistics starts increasing with a positive slope and
exceeds the threshold ξ (in the experimental tests the threshold ξ has
been set by means of Monte Carlo Simulation).
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The output of this phase is a binary matrix A[d][w], for each time-
bin, that contains a “1” if the time series corresponding to a given
bucket is considered anomalous at that time-bin, “0” otherwise.
Note that, given the nature of the sketches, each traffic flow is part
of several random aggregates (namely D aggregates), corresponding
to the D different hash functions.
Due to this fact, a voting algorithm is applied to the matrix A. The
algorithm simply verifies if at least H rows of A contain at least a
bucket set to “1” (H is a tunable parameter).
5.3.2 Identification
In all the three cases, if the voting system outputs the presence of an
anomaly in a given time-bin, the system applies the reversible sketch
algorithm (described in Chapter 2) to the sketch given by the value
of all the time series in that time-bin for identifying the IP flows
responsible for the anomalies.
5.4 Experimental results
The proposed systems have been tested using the dataset described
in Section 1.2.
Tables 5.1 to 5.12 report the results achieved by the three systems.
Since, given the nature of the dataset, we cannot plot a ROC curve, in
these tables we report the total number of detected anomalies and the
number of synthetic anomalies detected by the systems. Note that the
tables have been obtained varying the values of the threshold. The real
values of such a threshold are not reported since are not significant
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Total Synthetic
Threshold Anomalies Anomalies
tha 1969 154
thb 1920 48
thc 1381 28
thd 1269 23
Table 5.1: Change Detection - Method 1
in themselves, just consider that the first values correspond to the
highest threshold value for which the three systems detect all the 154
synthetic anomalies.
Hence, in general, the system is always able to obtain a 100% de-
tection rate (revealing all the 154 synthetic anomalies), but the per-
formance can be strongly different depending on the total number of
detected anomalies that has a direct impact on the number of false
alarms.
To start with, let us analyze the performance offered by the “clas-
sical” HC-based system, reported in Table 5.1. In this case, we can
easily see that for detecting all the synthetic anomalies, we have to
accept a total number of detection equal to 1969, which is not accept-
able. Moreover the number of detected synthetic anomalies suddenly
decreases when increasing the threshold, while the number of total
detected anomalies remains quite stable, making very hard the appli-
cation of the system in the “real world”.
Concerning Method 2, a first set of experimental tests has been re-
alized to evaluate the impact of the sketch dimension (namely the
impact of the parameter w) on the system performance. The ob-
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 1018 154
ψ2 602 152
ψ3 254 145
ψ4 192 142
ψ5 177 135
ψ6 157 127
ψ7 137 109
ψ8 115 90
ψ9 91 70
ψ10 65 46
Table 5.2: Change Detection - Method 2 (w = 256, EWMA α = 0.2, JSD)
Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 310 154
ψ2 256 152
ψ3 199 148
ψ4 179 144
ψ5 172 142
ψ6 167 137
ψ7 163 133
ψ8 151 123
ψ9 135 111
ψ10 115 94
Table 5.3: Change Detection - Method 2 (w = 512, EWMA α = 0.2, JSD)
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 210 154
ψ2 191 151
ψ3 175 145
ψ4 164 136
ψ5 144 123
ψ6 125 105
ψ7 80 61
ψ8 45 26
ψ9 34 16
ψ10 24 6
Table 5.4: Change Detection - Method 2 (w = 1024, EWMA α = 0.2, JSD)
tained results are presented in Tables 5.2 - 5.4 and correspond to
three distinct values of w, namely w = 256, w = 512, and w = 1024.
Regarding the other parameters, these tests have been realized us-
ing the EWMA forecasting algorithm (with α = 0.2) and the JSD
divergence.
Note that varying the value of the parameter w, not only does it have
an impact on the memory and computational resource consumption
(that would take to choose the lowest possible value for w), but it also
determines the dimension of the traffic aggregates. Indeed, sketches
are implicitly used for randomly aggregating the traffic flows. Thus a
low value of w means having few big aggregates and vice-versa a big
value of w means having many small aggregates. It is quite obvious
that this can influence the possibility of detecting anomalous flows in
the aggregates.
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From Table 5.2 we can easily see that using a sketch of dimension
w = 256 takes to unacceptable performance. Indeed, in this case,
for having a 100% detection rate, we have 1018 total detection of
anomalous time-bins (over a total of 2016) that correspond to a high
number of false alarms.
Things get definite better when considering w = 512 (see Table 5.3)
and w = 1024 (see Table 5.4). Indeed in these cases the system is able
to detect all the synthetic anomalies, with a total number of detections
of 310 and 210 respectively. To really evaluate the performance of the
two settings, we have performed a manual verification of the dataset,
checking the additional detections of the system. After that we can
conclude that, almost all the additional detections obtained with w =
512 (310 total detections minus the 154 synthetic anomalies) are real
anomalies already present in the traces. From this analysis we can
thus conclude that the best performance are obtained with w = 512,
indeed w = 256 takes to a big number of false alarms, while = 1024
takes to some false negatives (missed detections).
Moreover, note that, in any case, event though all the additional
detections obtained with w = 512 would not be “real” anomalies they
would correspond to a maximum false alarm rate of 8.3% that could
be considered as “acceptable”.
We can also easily notice, by analyzing Table 5.3, that the number of
detected synthetic anomalies varies quite slowly when increasing the
value of the threshold, while the number of total detection decreases
much faster. This fact makes easy the tuning of the system.
The second and third sets of experimental tests have been conducted
to tune the parameter of the forecasting algorithms, EWMA and
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 473 154
ψ2 333 153
ψ3 246 150
ψ4 208 146
ψ5 190 144
ψ6 172 137
ψ7 167 134
ψ8 150 121
ψ9 1697 117
ψ10 125 100
Table 5.5: Change Detection - Method 2 (w = 512, EWMA α = 0.5, JSD)
Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 688 154
ψ2 344 152
ψ3 284 149
ψ4 225 146
ψ5 1320 142
ψ6 276 136
ψ7 157 122
ψ8 1697 119
ψ9 1767 109
ψ10 126 85
Table 5.6: Change Detection - Method 2 (w = 512, EWMA α = 0.8, JSD)
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NSHW respectively.
In more detail, Tables 5.3, 5.5, and 5.6 present the results achieved
by the system using a sketch table of dimension w = 512, the JSD
divergence, and three distinct value of the smoothing parameter of
the EWMA algorithm, namely α = 0.2, α = 0.5, and α = 0.8.
From the tables we can notice that when increasing the value of
the smoothing parameter, we have an increase in the number of total
detection. Indeed for detecting all the synthetic anomalies the system
detects a total number of anomalies equal to 310 (case α = 0.2), 473
(case α = 0.5), or 688 (case α = 0.8). Also in this case, a manual
verification of the dataset has highlighted that most of the additional
detections obtained varying α corresponds to false alarms.
Moreover, additional tests (not shown for sake of brevity) have demon-
strated that varying the smoothing parameter around the value 0.2
(i.e., α ∈ [0.1, 0.3]), does not take to any significant variation in the
system performance.
From these considerations we can conclude that the best performance
are obtained when α = 0.2. Note that this is also supported by the
literature, indeed it is known that 0.2 is in the typical range of the
“optimal” smoothing parameter.
Moreover, using a low value of the smoothing parameter implies the
use of a model not much responsive to the fluctuations in the data.
This has a direct impact on our system performance. Indeed, by
analyzing Tables 5.5 and 5.6 we can notice that the system present
a “strange” behavior. Indeed the total number of detections is not
always decreasing, when increasing the value of the threshold. This
is due to the presence of “noisy samples” in the data and it is hence
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 402 154
ψ2 299 152
ψ3 237 146
ψ4 206 144
ψ5 187 139
ψ6 166 133
ψ7 159 128
ψ8 137 111
ψ9 122 98
ψ10 107 87
Table 5.7: Change Detection - Method 2 ( w = 512, NSHW α = 0.2
β = 0.2, JSD)
mitigated when the parameter α tends to zero.
Analogously to what done for tuning the smoothing parameter of
the EWMA algorithm, Tables 5.7 - 5.9 present an analysis of the
system performance obtained varying the value of the parameter β of
the NSHW algorithm (for sake of brevity we do not show the results
corresponding to different values of α, since they are similar to those
obtained for EWMA). In more detail the presented results have been
obtained by using a sketch dimension w = 512, the JSD divergence,
α = 0.2, and three distinct values of β, namely β = 0.2 (Table 5.7),
β = 0.5 (Table 5.8), and β = 0.8 (Table 5.9).
For these tables, the considerations done for the previous set of tests
are still valid and take us to conclude that the best value for the β
parameter is β = 0.2.
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 531 154
ψ2 372 153
ψ3 279 150
ψ4 237 144
ψ5 196 139
ψ6 185 133
ψ7 165 129
ψ8 154 118
ψ9 1695 113
ψ10 122 94
Table 5.8: Change Detection - Method 2 ( w = 512, NSHW α = 0.2
β = 0.5, JSD)
Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 660 154
ψ2 436 152
ψ3 322 150
ψ4 252 145
ψ5 206 140
ψ6 186 137
ψ7 185 132
ψ8 158 121
ψ9 1696 115
ψ10 146 99
Table 5.9: Change Detection - Method 2 ( w = 512, NSHW α = 0.2
β = 0.8, JSD)
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 968 154
ψ2 538 153
ψ3 329 150
ψ4 276 147
ψ5 1326 146
ψ6 412 136
ψ7 1319 127
ψ8 1768 122
ψ9 1767 111
ψ10 659 89
Table 5.10: Change Detection - Method 2 (w = 512, no forecasting, JSD)
Given these results, we can make a comparison between the use
of the EWMA and the NSHW algorithms, by comparing Table 5.3
and 5.7 that correspond to the best settings for the two considered
cases. The inspection of the dataset takes us to conclude that the
best performance are achieved when using the EWMA algorithm.
Table 5.10 present the results of the system when disabling the fore-
casting module (M̂HH is directly computed starting from T ref). By
comparing this table with the previous ones, we can see that disabling
the forecasting module takes to worsen the performance. This result
was predictable, indeed disabling the forecasting module is equivalent
to use the EWMA algorithm with α = 1, and the previous analysis
had already highlighted that the best performance are achieved with
low values of the smoothing parameter.
Lastly, Table 5.11 presents the performance achieved using the KL
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ψ1 221 154
ψ2 197 152
ψ3 182 148
ψ4 178 144
ψ5 174 141
ψ6 168 137
ψ7 161 130
ψ8 135 104
ψ9 115 86
ψ10 90 63
Table 5.11: Change Detection - Method 2 (w = 512, EWMA α = 0.2, KL)
divergence instead of the JSD divergence. Note that JSD divergence
has been introduced to overcome the potential limitations due to the
non-symmetric nature of the KL divergence, but no evidence is pro-
vided in the literature to conclude that it can offer better performance
in our case. Nevertheless the results presented in Table 5.11 (and the
manual inspection of the dataset), compared to those in Table 5.3,
confirm our intuition.
After this analysis we can thus conclude that the presented system
outperforms the “classical” HC-based methods and that the best set-
tings are those corresponding to the results presented in Table 5.3,
that is w = 512, EWMA algorithm with α = 0.2, and JSD diver-
gence.
Instead, concerning the CUSUM based method (see Table 5.12), we
can conclude that the system behaves very similarly to Method 2 (with
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w = 512 and α = 0.2), when reaching a detection rate of 100%. In-
deed when detecting all the 154 synthetic anomalies, the system only
detects 135 more anomalies, most of them corresponding to “real”
anomalies already present in the traces (as for Method 2). But its
performance are much less stable than those of Method 2, when rais-
ing the threshold. Indeed, when detecting a total number of about
180 anomalies we can see that Method 3 only detects 35 synthetic
anomalies, while our proposed method (Method 2) still detects 144
synthetic anomalies. This greater stability of our system makes eas-
ier the tuning of the system parameters and makes the method more
suitable for “real world” application.
Finally, to evaluate the computational complexity in time and mem-
ory space of Method 2 (we have not performed the same kind of test
for Method 1 and Method 3 because they are computationally much
easier), we have used a general purpose PC, equipped with an Intel
Core 2 Duo processor at 3GHz and 2GB of RAM. The experimental
results have shown that the system is able to process a whole week of
traffic from the Abilene/Internet2 network in about 531s, with a max-
imum memory consumption of 0.9% (about 1.8 MB). In more detail
the system is able to analyze a single time-bin of 5 minutes of traffic
related to a single router in about 29ms, demonstrating to be suitable
for the on-line detection of anomalies in backbone networks.
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Total Synthetic
Threshold Anomalies Anomalies
thA 289 154
thB 287 153
thB 178 35
thB 160 14
thC 154 12
thD 134 10
thE 125 8
thF 107 7
thG 94 6
thH 88 5
thI 73 4
thL 47 3
Table 5.12: Change Detection - Method 3
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Chapter 6
Wave-CUSUM -
combining Wavelet and
CUSUM
6.1 Wavelet Pre-Filtering
The direct application of the methods described in the previous chap-
ters is sometimes difficult because of the time-varying nature of the
traffic (e.g., daily and weekly trends) that makes somehow hard to
distinguish a network anomaly from a “normal” variation of the dis-
tribution of the traffic.
To solve such an issue, we propose to combine a “classical” CUSUM
based approach together with the wavelet analysis. In more detail the
latter is used to filter out the seasonal trends in the network traffic
before applying the “real” anomaly detection algorithm, based on the
CUSUM method.
The main idea is used the Wavelet Decomposition for organizing
the data onto different components, that is a hierarchy of component
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“signals”.
The lower component contains very sparse filtered information that
can be thought of as sophisticated aggregations of the original data.
We refer to that part of the representation as the low-frequency rep-
resentation. In contrast, the very high strata in the hierarchy capture
fine-grained details of the data, such as spontaneous variations. These
are referred to as the high-frequency strata.
In more detail the method works as follows.
At first, we extract from the original signal the aforementioned hi-
erarchy of derived signals. This is done as an iterative process.
g
h 2
2g
h 2
2g
h 2
2x
Level 1 Level 3Level 2
Figure 6.1: Wavelet Decomposition
The input for each iteration is a signal x (see Figure 6.1) of length
N . The output is a collection of two or more derived signals, each of
which is of length N/2. Each output signal is obtained by convolving
x with an specially designed filter F and then decimating every other
coefficient of that convolution product. We denote by F (x) the output
signal so obtained.
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One of the special filters, denoted in the figure as g, has a smooth-
ing/averaging effect, and its corresponding output g(x) is the low-
frequency output. Instead, the output of the other filter h(x) should
capture only the fine-grained details, i.e. the high-frequency content
of the signal x.
The iterations proceed with the further decomposition of g(x), cre-
ating the (shorter) signals g2(x), h1g(x). Continuing in this manner,
we obtain a family of output signals of the form higj−1(x). The index
j counts the number of low-pass filtering iterations applied to obtain
the output signal: the larger the value of j, the lower the derived signal
is in our hierarchy. Indeed, we refer to higj−1(x) as belonging to the
jth frequency level, and consider a higher value of j to corresponding
to a lower frequency. If our original signal x consists of measurements
taken at five minute intervals, then the derived signal higj−1(x) con-
sists of data values that are 2j × 5 minutes apart one from the other.
Thus, as j grows, the corresponding output signal becomes shorter
and records a smoother part of the signal. The values of the derived
signals higj−1(x) are known as the wavelet coefficients.
Instead, if we perform the synthesis iterations at each step the input
signals for the iteration are gj(x), higj−1(x), and the output is the
signal gj−1(x). This is exactly the inverse of the jth iteration of the
analysis algorithm. By employing that step sufficiently many times,
one recaptures the original signal.
Instead, if we would like to ignore some information we can alter
some of the values of some of the derived signals of the decomposition
step and then applying reconstruction. The general idea is to suppress
all the values that carry information that we would like to ignore. For
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example, if we wish to view the fine-grained spontaneous changes in
the data only, we will apply a threshold to the entries in all the low-
frequency levels, i.e. replace them by zeros.
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Figure 6.2: Original Signal (traffic aggregate over one week)
Thus, using the wavelet analysis we are able to extract three different
output signals:
• Low-frequency component (Figure 6.3)
• Mid-frequency component (Figure 6.4)
• High-frequency component (Figure 6.5)
The Low-frequency component (L-component) is obtained by syn-
thesizing all the low-frequency wavelet coefficients from levels 9 and
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Figure 6.3: Reconstructed Signal - Low-frequency Component
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Figure 6.4: Reconstructed Signal - Mid-frequency Component
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Figure 6.5: Reconstructed Signal - High-frequency Component
up. It is able to capture patterns and anomalies of very long duration
(several days and up). The signal here is very sparse, and captures
weekly patterns in the data quite well. For many different types of In-
ternet data, the L-component of the signal reveals a very high degree
of regularity and consistency in the traffic, hence can reliably capture
anomalies of long duration.
The Mid-frequency component (M-component), instead, is obtained
by synthesizing the wavelets coefficients from frequency levels 6, 7, 8.
The signal here has zero-mean, and is supposed to mainly capture the
daily variations in the data.
Finally, the High-frequency component (H-component) is obtained
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by thresholding the wavelet coefficients in the first 5 frequency levels,
i.e. setting to zero all coefficients whose absolute value falls below
a chosen threshold (and setting to zero all the coefficients in level 6
and up). The need for thresholding stems from the fact that most of
the data in the high-frequency component consists of small short-term
variations, variations that we think of as “noise” and do not aid us in
our anomaly detection objective.
6.2 System Architecture
In this section we detail the architecture of the proposed Intrusion
Detection System, (Figure 6.6 depicts the proposed architecture).
The system is composed of four blocks:
• Data Formatting
• Sketch Module
• Anomaly Detector
• Identification
In the following we describe the Anomaly Detector and the Identi-
fication module. Instead, for an exhaustive analysis of the first two
blocks refer to Section 1.2.
Note that at the end of this first two phases, given that we had N
distinct time-bins, we have obtained N distinct sketch tables T nD×w,
where n ∈ (1, 2, . . . , N) is the time-bin.
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Figure 6.6: Wave-CUSUM - System Architecture
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6.2.1 Wavelet Module
At this point, starting from the N distinct sketch tables we consider
the temporal evolution of each bucket Tlj of the sketch table, con-
structing d · w time series of N samples Tlj[n].
These time series are given as input to the wavelet module, which
computes the coefficients of the transformed signal. The wavelet de-
composition is performed on six steps (namely we obtain six levels
of transformed coefficients) by using Daubechies-4 as mother wavelet.
To filter out the daily and weekly trends the signal is then recon-
structed by using the coefficients from levels one to five, and inserting
null coefficients in the sixth level. The result of this synthesis op-
eration (as shown in Section 6.3) is the original signal without the
seasonal behavior.
Note that, taking the value of the different time series at each time-
bin, we are able to reconstruct the corresponding sketch table (this will
be used in the following for the detection and identification phases).
6.2.2 Detection Module
The reconstructed time series obtained after the wavelet analysis and
synthesis, are given in input to the detection module, where the MNP-
CUSUM algorithm is performed (analogously to what already de-
scribed in Section 5.3.1).
About the MNP-CUSUM algorithm it is worth noticing that the
quantity µ and σ have been estimated by using the EWMA algorithm,
while the value of the parameter c has been set equal to 0.5 (also note
that the algorithm has experimentally shown to be robust to the choice
of this parameter).
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An anomaly, in a given time series, is thus detected at a given time-
bin, if the test statistics starts increasing with a positive slope and
exceeds the threshold ξ. Note that, in the experimental tests the
threshold ξ has been set by means of Monte Carlo Simulation.
The output of this phase is a binary matrix (A[d][w]), for each time-
bin, that contains a “1” if the time series corresponding to a given
bucket is considered anomalous at that time-bin , “0” otherwise.
Note that, given the nature of the sketches, each traffic flow is part
of several random aggregates (namely D aggregates), corresponding
to the D different hash functions. This means that, in practice, any
flow will be checked D times to verify if it presents any anomaly (this
is done because an anomalous flow could be masked in a given traffic
aggregate, while being detectable in another one).
Due to this fact, a voting algorithm is applied to the matrix A. The
algorithm simply verifies if at least H rows of A contain at least a
bucket set to “1” (H is a tunable parameter). If so, the mediator
reveals an anomaly, otherwise the matrix A is discarded.
6.2.3 Identification phase
In case the voting system outputs the presence of an anomaly in a
given time-bin, the system applies the reversible sketch algorithm to
the sketch table given by the value of all the time series in that time-
bin for identifying IP flows responsible for the anomalies (see Chapter
2 for the algorithm details).
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6.3 Experimental results
Before analyzing the performance of the system in terms of detected
anomalies, in the first three figures we empirically show the reason for
which the method is able to improve the “classical” CUSUM methods.
Figure 6.2 shows the temporal evolution of one of the buckets of the
sketch over one week, before performing the wavelet analysis. In more
detail, it represents the number of bytes received by an IP aggregate
and, as can be clearly observed, presents the “typical” seasonality of
the network traffic, with a daily and a weekly trend. It is easy to
understand that the seasonality in the data can make difficult the
detection of some anomalies, which can be masked by such a trend.
Figure 6.7 shows the same traffic aggregate, after the wavelet anal-
ysis. As described in the previous section the signal has been recon-
structed after that the wavelet coefficients corresponding to the low
frequencies (level six) have been put to zero. The result is that the
daily as well as the weekly trends of the signal have “disappeared”,
making intuitively easier the detection of the anomalies.
This intuition is confirmed by the plot of the CUSUM statistics in
Figure 6.8, where we can easily see that the statistics related to the
original signal (dotted line) is much more “rugged” than the one re-
lated to the reconstructed signal (solid line). Hence, considering that
(as stated in the theoretical section on CUSUM) an anomaly is re-
vealed if the CUSUM statistics starts increasing and exceeds a given
threshold, our method seems to be more robust to signal noise that
the “classical” method; the following tables show that this intuition
is confirmed by the experimental results.
Since, given the nature of the dataset, we cannot plot a ROC curve,
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Figure 6.7: Wave-CUSUM - Reconstructed Signal
in the following tables we report the total number of detected anoma-
lies and the number of synthetic anomalies detected by the system.
Note that the tables have been obtained varying the values of the
threshold ξ. The real values of such thresholds (set by Monte-Carlo
simulation) are not reported since are not significant in themselves,
just consider that the first values (namely ξ1) always corresponds to
the highest threshold value for which the system is able to detect all
the 154 synthetic anomalies.
Hence, in general, the system is always able to obtain a 100% de-
tection rate (revealing all the 154 synthetic anomalies), but the per-
formance can be strongly different depending on the total number of
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Figure 6.8: Wave-CUSUM - CUSUM statistics
detected anomalies that has a direct impact on the number of false
alarms.
Slightly differently to what done when testing the systems described
in the previous chapters, in this case to assess the validity of the
proposed system we have carried out three distinct sets of simulations,
in which we have injected, in the original traces, anomalies of low,
medium and high intensity/volume. It is worth noticing that, in all
the three cases, these anomalies result to be much “smaller” than
those used for the previous systems. This is justified by the fact that
using the same traces used for the other methods, the behavior of the
CUSUMmethod already takes to very good performance and it is thus
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ξ1 703 154
ξ2 412 137
ξ3 348 94
ξ4 297 67
ξ5 226 9
ξ6 189 7
ξ7 102 6
Table 6.1: Wave-CUSUM - low volume anomalies
difficult to demonstrate that the wavelet pre-filtering phase effectively
takes to some improvements. But, this becomes much more evident
when using anomalies of smaller entity as the one used in this section.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 respectively present the performance of our system
(named Wave-CUSUM) and of the classical CUSUM system, when
facing the detection of low volume anomalies. We can easily notice
that the performance are strongly different; indeed our system, when
detecting all the 154 synthetic, also detects 549 additional anomalies
(703 total anomalies minus the synthetic ones), while the “classical”
system detects 809 additional anomalies. In this case, to really eval-
uate the performance of the system, we have performed a manual
verification of the dataset, checking the additional detections of the
system. From that, we can conclude that, about 150 anomalies of the
549 detected by our system are real anomalies and 150 are suspicious
activities. That means that our system has a false positive rate be-
tween the 12% and 20%, when the detection rate (over the synthetic
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ξ1 963 154
ξ2 806 19
ξ3 778 17
ξ4 740 16
ξ5 710 14
ξ6 623 13
ξ7 595 12
Table 6.2: CUSUM - low volume anomalies
anomalies) is 100%, while for the classical system the false positive
rate raises to about the 25%-33%. Note that the “classical” system
does not detect all the anomalies already present in the data, while
detecting some more “false” anomalies. Moreover we can notice from
Table 6.1 that we can obtain a negligible false alarm rate, when the
detection rate is about the 89%, while it is not possible to lower the
false alarm rate without significantly worsen the detection rate for the
classical system.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 represent the same results seen in the previous
tables, when considering medium volume anomalies. Also in this case,
we can easily see that the two systems present strongly different per-
formance. Indeed, in this case our system is able to achieve an almost
ideal behavior obtaining the 100% of correct detection in correspon-
dence of a negligible false alarm rate, while the “classical” system,
when achieving the 100% of detection rate also has a false alarm rate
between 22% and 30%. Also we can notice has our system results to
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ξ1 308 154
ξ2 256 117
ξ3 205 80
ξ4 182 75
ξ5 121 16
ξ6 80 7
ξ7 60 6
Table 6.3: Wave-CUSUM - medium volume anomalies
Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ξ1 751 154
ξ2 612 23
ξ3 598 17
ξ4 571 16
ξ5 537 15
ξ6 514 13
ξ7 491 11
Table 6.4: CUSUM - medium volume anomalies
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ξ1 303 154
ξ1 262 154
ξ2 127 19
ξ3 124 17
ξ4 85 16
ξ5 39 14
ξ6 33 13
Table 6.5: Wave-CUSUM - high volume anomalies
be robust to small variations in the values of the threshold, while the
“classical” method performance abruptly change when varying the
threshold.
Finally, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the performance of the two systems
in the detection of high volume anomalies. Note that in this case, in
our system, the value of ξ1 is not the highest value for which the system
detects all the synthetic anomalies, but the highest value for which the
system is able to also detect the about 150 anomalies already present
in the original data. For these results, the considerations done in the
previous two cases are still valid. Indeed our system is able to detect
all the anomalies with a negligible false alarm rate, while with the
“classical” system we must accept a high false alarm rate, also when
not detecting all the anomalies.
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Threshold Total Anomalies Synthetic Anomalies
ξ1 554 154
ξ2 424 27
ξ3 418 14
ξ4 382 12
ξ5 365 10
ξ6 340 9
ξ7 317 8
Table 6.6: CUSUM - high volume anomalies
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In the last years, the increasing number and variety of security attacks
in IP-based network infrastructures have caused growing problems for
network operators and users, leading to the need of developing new
security architectures.
In this scenario the use of Intrusion Detection Systems has emerged
as a key element, since it permits to tackle security threats by mas-
querader, misfeasor and clandestine users. In order to identify new
ad hoc attacks, the development of anomaly based NIDSs assumes a
primary role.
In this dissertation we have presented some novel anomaly based
NIDSs, which detect anomalies by means of some novel statistical
techniques.
We have discussed several statistical approaches, such as Wavelet
Analysis, Principal Component Analysis, Heavy change detection, and
CUSUM.
In more detail, regarding the Wavelet Analysis we have detailed a
novel multi time-scale anomaly detection method, based on a com-
bined use of sketch and wavelet analysis. The use of wavelet trans-
form is justified, despite our approach is original in several aspects,
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by the vast literature on the topic, which demonstrates the effective-
ness of such analysis in detecting network anomalies. Nevertheless,
the application of the wavelets to the single traffic flows results to be
unscalable and thus not applicable in modern backbone networks. For
this reason we have applied this transform on the top of probabilistic
structures, namely the sketches, that allow us to obtain a scalable
real-time system, while simultaneously improving the detection rate
of classical approaches.
As far as Principal Component Analysis is concerned, we have based
our approach on the main idea of using PCA to decompose the traffic
variations into their normal and anomalous components, thus reveal-
ing an anomaly if the anomalous components exceed an appropriate
threshold. It is important to highlight that all we have worked at dif-
ferent time-scales and on different levels of aggregation so as to detect
anomalies that could be masked at some aggregation level. More-
over, we have applied the method both to the entropy associated to
some given traffic descriptors and to the Kullback-Leibler divergence
computed over the histogram of such descriptors.
Regarding the change detection techniques, we have explored both
the use of “classical” methods and novel methods. In more detail, we
have presented a novel method, based on the idea of discovering heavy
changes in the distribution of the heavy hitters in the network traffic.
To this aim we have explored the use of several forecasting algorithms
for predicting the near-future distribution of the heavy hitters and
we have then applied heavy change based methods to the predicted
values.
Finally we have discussed the combined use of the wavelet analysis
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and the CUSUM algorithm. The CUSUM (CUmulative SUM) algo-
rithm is one of the most promising techniques to detect significant
changes in the descriptors of the network traffic. Thus the main idea
is to use the variation of the distribution of these descriptors to de-
tect a network anomalies. Nevertheless the time-varying nature of
the traffic (e.g., daily and weekly trends) makes somehow difficult to
distinguish a network anomaly from a normal variation of the distri-
bution of the traffic. To solve such an issue, in this thesis, we have
proposed to combine a classical CUSUM based approach together
with the wavelet analysis. In more detail the latter is used to filter
out the seasonality from the traffic aggregates so as to improve the
performance of the CUSUM based anomaly detection techniques.
For all of these techniques we have discussed the system architecture.
Moreover we have shown the performance achieved by the different
systems over the Abilene/Internet2 dataset. The performance analysis
has highlighted that all the implemented systems obtain, for a proper
choice of their parameters, very good performance.
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